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Abstract
Information markets benefit the communities they serve by facilitating electronic distributed
exchange of information. Further benefits include enhancing knowledge sharing, innovation,
and productivity. This research explores innovative market mechanisms to build long-
term sustainable incentives that many existing platforms fail to provide, while encouraging
pro-social behavior. A key advantage of this research is direct application of established
information economic and macroeconomic theories to the design of social software and
knowledge platforms.
The research contribution is the design of a complete framework for information economy,
which consists of several distinct components: 1) a market engine for exchanging information
products that are non-rivalrous and non-excludable; 2) a serialized currency system that
enables monetary acceleration; 3) "monetary policies" that ensure a healthy growth of
currency supply; 4) "fiscal policies" that reward information reuse and good behavior such
as tagging, voting, tipping, and fraud reporting.
We built a web-based software platform called Barter, and have deployed it at several
universities. Analysis of user data helps test information market effectiveness and illustrates
effects of various market interventions. We present our key findings learned in the process
of system deployment, such as the impacts of social connections on market interactions
and fraud, effects of bounty on information quality, market fraud and intervention of fraud
prevention mechanism.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Knowledge and innovation represent significant organizational resources and directly affect
organizational success and competitiveness. First-generation attempts to manage knowl-
edge and support innovation relied mainly on centralized Knowledge Management Systems
(KMS). Despite their potential, the top-down approach to both content elicitation and val-
idation deployed in these systems has left a large community base with unsolved knowledge
problems [3]. The emerging literature on open innovation and crowd-sourcing demonstrates
the value of openness for innovation and problem solving[26]. But in addition to benefits, it
highlights difficulties in motivating participation[19] [16] [1] [8].We believe an important rea-
son for participation failure is faulty incentive structures. Members of an organization lack
the motivation to participate and share information, especially given their existing work
commitments and reporting hierarchies. In other cases, the competitive culture of the or-
ganization discourages members from sharing knowledge; questions can be interpreted as
a sign of weakness; or people believe information sharing implies giving up competitive
advantage. These practical challenges motivate the research presented here.
The importance of incentive design goes beyond the scope of organizational knowledge man-
agement. Pervasive web and mobile platforms gather the "wisdom of crowds" [26]. Web 2.0
15
systems encourage self expression and promote collaboration [22]. "Peer production" refers
to the aggregate work of a decentralized community [22]. A cookbook of community de-
sign properties has been proposed to facilitate "collective intelligence" [18]. The abundance
and convenience of information create an unprecedented information ecology among human
beings. A flurry of platforms have been invented to realize these crowdsourcing models, in-
cluding social bookmarking (reddit.com), review/rating exchange (yelp.com, Amazon.com),
Q & A (quora.com), and task completion (Mechanical Turk) to name a few. New systems
appear constantly on the horizon.
These systems are predicated on incentives: users need to feel motivated to spend limited
time and attention sharing knowledge with others. Success therefore depends on sustainable
incentives. People contribute for a variety of reasons: altruism, building reputations, gaining
expertise, fun, compensation, etc. Broadly speaking, these fall into "social incentives" and
''material incentives." While many existing platforms rely heavily on social incentives,
few explore material incentives. When they do, users may not perceive fair rewards in
proportion to contribution. Fixed fees and managerial hierarchies employing top down
centrally planned incentives, neglect the power of the crowd itself to determine appropriate
rewards. As a result, market design has much to offer organizations whose earlier choices
failed to deliver long-term effectiveness, fairness, and stability [9].
There are many starting points for designing incentives. But, whether the levers are social
or material, it helps to first ask which specific behaviors we wish to motivate. Designing
an information market should depend on behaviors firms want to promote. As a starting
point, we suggest desirable behaviors include (1) motivation to participate in the market.
This is sometimes called "market thickness" as people need others with whom to trade
[13]. (2) The market should motivate sharing and disclosure. As noted, there are many
reasons why keeping information private can provide strategic advantage or why sharing
might simply be too bothersome. (3) Design should also motivate efficient allocation of
resources and attention. Time spent sharing gossip might be better spent sharing insights
or even working solo. (4) Motivation should promote idea development even when others
can free ride. (5) De-motivation caused by theft and fraud should be avoided. Thus design
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should include a measure of "market safety." (6) Finally, apart from individual motivation,
design should enable regulation and motivate those responsible for running the system to
do so for the benefit of the community.
These challenges inspire us to reconsider and compare how we human beings organize our
production and wealth distribution in the real world: we have created a product-service
economy with market forces that guide the allocation of resources and direct human power.
The goal shifts away from design of an IT or a knowledge management system to design of
a complete knowledge economy. The shift resembles the transition from a centrally planned
system to one that is market based. One view characterizes this problem differently:
"Managing an information economy within the firm can improve forecasting,
innovation, and productivity. ... Markets cause resources to speak up and self-
identify. Markets provide the framework to arbitrage the gap between problem
and opportunity. To get these benefits, executives must bring market forces
to bear within the firm. The rules, the rewards, and the running of internal
markets differ from those of a hierarchy." [4, p. 67]
In our system, pivotal factors of such a decentralized economy include social factors such as
status, reputation, and an ability to publicly acknowledge others members of the commu-
nity. Economic factors include currency, a "Federal Reserve", prices, and transfer payments.
Though stumbling occasionally, a well-established economy sustains its own growth, fair-
ness, and efficiency.
1.2 Problem Statement & Goals
Research presented in this dissertation is motivated by organizational challenges on in-
formation sharing and decentralized innovation. How can we build a platform that fully
explores the wisdom of the crowd and maximizes the creation, contribution and distribu-
tion of knowledge and innovation. From the overview in the previous section, clearly user
17
adoption is a factual, and the most challenging problem to conquer. An effective incentive
mechanism design lies at the center of the problem domain.
The set of problems are organized and tackled in the following order, which also shows how
the related problem space has evolved:
1. Existing knowledge platforms inside organizations such as knowledge management
systems (KMS) face the challenges of 1) early adoption and elicitation of user contri-
bution, 2) validation and update of knowledge, and 3) valuation of knowledge, user
contribution, and user expertise;
2. A crowd-sourcing based platform where users generate contents and innovation ap-
pears to be an effective mechanism. However, such platforms still suffer from user
participation / adoption problem. Designing a long-term sustainable incentive struc-
ture is a critical goal;
3. Using virtual currency to construct incentives is gaining popularity in practice and
proves effective in many systems. How do we back up the value of virtual currency
with material utilities?
4. With the virtual currency, how does the platform price knowledge objects it elicits
from users? Shall the platform deploy decentralized knowledge markets, or a top-down
approach where different types of knowledge objects are fixed-priced?
5. Building information markets supported by the usage of virtual currency to construct
economic incentives while still encouraging pro-social behaviors points to a promising
direction to address the incentive problem. However, information, or knowledge, has
peculiar properties that makes a market for information products prone to failure.
How to build efficient information markets that tackle these peculiar characteristics
of information products?
6. There are further challenges: what if users commit fraud or game market rules to gain
unfair advantages? what if people hoard their points without spending? what tools
18
does the platform offer to managers for stimulating user activities and maintaining
healthy growth of the platform?
These problems and goals will be revisited and further expanded in the next chapter. "Iden-
tifying" these challenges itself constitutes an important goal of this dissertation research.
1.3 Contribution
The main contribution of this dissertation is to apply established economic theories, market
practice and mechanism design to optimize knowledge platforms and solve four problems:
1. Can we shift users from non-participants to participants?
2. Can we increase activity among those who do participate?
3. Can we cause information to be created?
4. Can we value this information?
We clearly identify and list challenges in the problem space. A key innovation presented in
this dissertation is a complete design of a knowledge economy framework that effectively
tackles these challenges, which consists of knowledge currency, knowledge markets engine,
and economic policies.
We have developed a web-based software platform, Barter, to demonstrate the concept and
deployed it at universities. As a beta test, our description of Barter does not yet provide
complete answers to all questions. Rather, we will show how to incorporate economics
and mechanism design into system architecture. We then provide insights gained from the
deployments and data analysis.
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1.4 Economic & Market Theories
1.4.1 Overview
Several domains of economic theories constitute the theoretical foundation of this disserta-
tion research. Further more, they provide guidance in the design of an information market,
and practical instruments to tackle various organizational challenges on knowledge manage-
ment, crowd-sourcing and incentive design. Quoted from Foss & Mahnke[11]:
"Surprisingly, however, organizational economics ... has played no role in the
development of knowledge management."
Market theories and industry practice provide further insights and guidance in having the
market of information goods healthily grow and properly managed.
In the section, we review the set of economic and market theories used in this dissertation
research, and explain how they are applied to different problem domains.
1.4.2 Economics of Information
A classical subject addressed by this discipline is the problem of information asymmetry,
which is manifested as "adverse selection" and "moral hazard". A market with severe
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers is prone to failure. "Screening" and
"signaling" are effective mechanisms to mitigate information asymmetry.
A separate but related problem tackled by information economics is on trading information
goods. Information products are fundamentally different from regular commodities such as
crude oil, stocks, corns, or clothes. Information products exhibit similar properties as those
of public goods: non-rivalry, non-excludability, 0-repetition cost, and spillover effects.
Economics of Information provides essential guidance in designing knowledge markets be-
cause of the information products exchanged on knowledge markets and information asym-
20
metry between buyers and sellers of knowledge. In addition, the spillover effects of infor-
mation products make valuation of knowledge challenging. Near-zero reproduction cost
also presents serious challenges to the safety and integrity of knowledge markets. When
knowledge is non-excludable with zero reproduction costs, how shall we design a market
that accounts for these distortions and prevents market failure[6]?
1.4.3 Two-Sided Market Theory
Two-sided markets, or two-sided networks, are economic platforms having two distinct user
groups that provide each other with network benefits. The adoption of a new platform with
two-sided networks faces a classical chicken-and-egg problem - participation by users on
one side recursively depends on participation from the other side. Examples include credit
cards (card holders / merchants), operating systems (end users / developers), etc.
Two-sided market theory describes how to promote adoption of a technology standard and
stimulate third-party development by subsidizing user / developer network effects. For
knowledge management, this tells us how to get users to adopt a new system and how to
subsidize content creation and content consumption so employees themselves add continuous
value [23].
An organizational information market platform is also a two-sided network with informa-
tion consumers versus information producers (contributors). The success of deploying such
a platform inside an organization thus critically depends on solving the chicken-and-egg
problem during early user adoption. Compared with ordinary two-sided networks, an infor-
mation market is equipped with unique tools to tackle the adoption problem by introducing
virtual currency and using macroeconomic policies to seed the market.
1.4.4 Price Theory
Price theory describes how markets efficiently allocate resources across an entire economy
using only private information. It also tells how markets supply missing goods. For knowl-
edge management, this is critical in getting people to produce valuable knowledge for others
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but only when this is more valuable than what they are already doing. It can also tell us
how to value intangibles [27, 15], and measure the value created in an information economy.
Several case studies indicate that companies are willing to invest heavily to create monetary
incentives for their employees to participate in knowledge sharing activities. However, many
used fixed-pricing incentive schemes so that employees received a predetermined amount of
money, frequent flier miles, or corporate shares for providing certain types of information.
As a result, information whose value was above the given price was never provided, and lots
of garbage information got collected. In these cases, prices and incentives were determined
using a top-down approach, which resulted in mis-allocation of resources and under-creation
of knowledge by the community. Moreover, these cases were one-time promotion campaigns
after which knowledge got outdated and user activities withered quickly.
In contrast, floating prices facilitate decentralized knowledge creation, using the invisible
hands to fully maximize the collective surplus of information consumers and suppliers. An
information market provides long-term sustainable incentive structure for organizations.
1.4.5 Quantity Theory of Money
Quantity theory of money describes, as a special case of macroeconomics, how to manage
a supply of value - money, credits, or points - to achieve economic vitality and growth by
choosing expansionary or contractionary policies. For knowledge management, this shows
how to stimulate and regulate trade volume in the firm's internal knowledge economy[12, 10].
In its simplest form, quantity theory of money establishes a relationship among money
supply, velocity of currency, and price levels in the economy
M-V=P.Q (1.1)
where M is the total amount of currency supply in the economy, V is the velocity of currency
in final expenditure, Q represents the real output, and P is the corresponding price level.
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From this relationship, we learn that economic activities and price levels can be controlled
by adjusting currency supply and turnover rate in the economy.
Based on quantity theory of money, an information market platform is equipped with a set
of powerful and important macroeconomic tools to monitor and regulate the healthy growth
of the knowledge economy. Managing and promoting a knowledge platform is no longer the
sole responsibility of an IT manager, but also of a "chief economist" who monitors different
economic variables to track the state of the knowledge economy, and employs different
macroeconomic policies to stimulate or moderate activities.
1.4.6 Financial Markets Theory
General market design principles are covered in the following chapter. Financial Markets
Theory provides conditions, rules and guidelines for securitizing information products so
they can be exchanged on a secondary market [20]. As shown in later chapters, securitizing
information products derives from a crucial fact that information published on the platform
generates long-term income flows. Information providers have incentives to maintain and
improve the quality of supplied knowledge for larger long-term gains. Other users, who
are not original authors, can opt to participate in contributing to a knowledge object by
purchasing its "shares". Securitizing information and "trading" resulting securities on the
derivative market provides advanced instruments to solve several challenging problems, and
supplements fun and gamification components to the knowledge economy platform.
The theory also covers computerized market-making algorithms [7] when we design a market
for trading certain types of standardized information products and securities.
Industry practice of today's securities markets provides meaningful guidance and references
when we design organizational markets for knowledge.
In addition to the economic theories listed above, several other research fields also play
crucial roles in the design process of an information market and impact its overall success.
For example, we apply Natural Language Processing (NLP) to understand textual con-
tents users create. Social network modeling and analysis helps understand the dynamics
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of social interactions and how information propagates through the network. Information
presentation and visualization is particularly important when we design dashboards and
gadgets to monitor or control global and personal economic activities. Another closely re-
lated area is user interface design, or more broadly, human-computer interaction (HCI),
which determines the usability and user experiences of the software system.
1.5 Organization
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we revisit
the problem space and clearly present challenges that this dissertation plans to attack, and
explain market design principles we adhere to. We then focus on applying economic theories
and practice to designing a knowledge economy, and delineating the system architecture,
covered in detail in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we select several key modules, such as monetary
and fiscal policies, from the system architecture and perform a rigorous analysis of their
inputs and outputs, further consolidating the mechanism design. Chapter 5 discusses about
software development and deployment, and provides lessons learned from analyzing user
data. We conclude and point to future directions in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Design Fundamentals
2.1 Overview
This chapter contains definitions, terminology, and design principles we adhere to through-
out our system design and software development. We first define and model knowledge ob-
jects (KO) and extended knowledge objects (EKO). Next, we revisit the problem domain,
clearly identify the problems this dissertation research is aiming to solve, and unambigu-
ously differentiate our contribution. Magnifying targeted problems in an organizational
setting and highlighting the failure of existing solutions help us lay down the groundwork
and the context for our future discussions on information markets. We then focus on proving
the effectiveness of a market-based architecture design, and explaining why certain design
principles are followed so the targeted problems can be effectively tackled.
2.2 Modeling Knowledge Objects
In .- rder to tackle knowledge-related challenges, we first need to define knowledge and its
instan+iation in the context of this research. We thus define "knowledge objects (KO)" and
n1 7.: ge objects (EKO)".
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A knowledge object is a piece of information that carries wisdom. Other users care about its
availability and value, and can learn something when reading it. On a knowledge platform,
it can be instantiated as
" an answer to a question,
" a PDF / Word document, or a Powerpoint presentation,
" a solution to a problem,
" a Blog article or a WIKI article,
" a piece of news or a simple status update,
e a picture or a video clip,
" a comment on other knowledge objects, a comment on a comment,
0 ...
These examples represent different subclasses of knowledge objects that are often under-
created in today's knowledge-sharing and user-generated contents (UGC) platforms, and
what we wish to promote in their creation and sharing.
There is a special type of knowledge objects - "requests for knowledge objects". Knowledge
objects may get created with or without elicitation. A question that waits for answers,
a request for documents, are examples of such requests for knowledge objects. Requests
and supplied knowledge objects constitute the two sides of the knowledge markets. User
activities and interactions on the knowledge markets overtime build up the knowledge base
for future search and reuse. Requests for knowledge objects are also modeled as knowledge
objects because they carry wisdom, deliver value, and exhibit similar properties as covered
below.
We model them as "knowledge objects", an abstract class, because they carry common
attributes that are essential to the knowledge-related problem space, and play important
roles in the design of knowledge markets. Examples of these attributes include
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Authorship & Credit Tracking - Who is the creator of a knowledge object; whether
and how its content derives from other authors' prior work; By tracking credits and
derivation relationships, knowledge objects can be organized as a connected graph, on
which each knowledge object is represented as a node;
Pricing Signals - A knowledge object may be protected by a price as the minimum
currency needed for accessing contents, or may be freely available, in which case the
price is zero; A request for knowledge objects may post bounty as "commitment to
pay" once knowledge is supplied in future;
Reuse Tracking & Valuation - Valuation of regular goods is usually determined by
fair market price of recent transactions, which does not apply to knowledge objects.
Knowledge objects have spillover effects, so their valuation is significantly impacted
by their reuse, in addition to the first-time transaction price;
Preview Generation - A summary, preview, or snapshot of the knowledge object should
be disclosed to the buyer if the knowledge object is guarded with a price. The purpose
is to reduce information asymmetry;
Signaling of Quality - Number of votes (thumb-ups) received, unique page visits, amount
of payment received, are all proxies to the quality of the knowledge object. Similarly
to preview generation, these signals help minimize information asymmetry when the
knowledge object is non-free;
Tagging - Accurate and sufficient tags (keywords) provided to each knowledge object are
instrumental in knowledge indexing, searching and reuse, and they help identify and
categorize knowledge providers' expertise.
Knowledge objects exhibit strong characteristics of information products which present
significant challenges to constructing a marketplace for exchanging these objects.
Examples of extended knowledge objects (EKO) include
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Voting (Thumbing) - Users vote on the quality, usefulness, or relevance by simply click-
ing on a vote-up or vote-down button, which is often referred to as collective or social
filtering;
Tagging - Users supply new tags to knowledge objects or vote on existing ones, which
helps knowledge indexing, searching, and reuse;
Payment (Tipping) - Users make payments on knowledge objects to their providers, or
simply "tip" them to show appreciation.
Extended knowledge objects do not directly carry wisdom in them. Instead, their presence
and sufficiency helps value, index, and sort the knowledge objects they are associated with.
Extended knowledge objects are highlighted in this research, because in most platforms they
also suffer from the under-creation problem. Although their creation involves very minimal
efforts that are not more than clicking on a button, users lack the incentive to perform such
simple actions.
2.3 Challenges & Design Goals - A Framework
Fig.2-1 shows the conceptual step-by-step development of how knowledge-related challenges
faced by organizations lead to this dissertation research. We will discuss in detail on each
block.
2.3.1 Step 1 - Existing Organizational Challenges
Today's organizations often face the following challenges that have been long-lasting
L.a - Knowledge Sharing & Retention - How to encourage members to share knowl-
edge with each other; how to retain people's knowledge from their minds within the
organization even after they depart;
28
Existing organizational
challenges
eProductivity of knowledge
workers
*Knowledge management:
sharing and retaining
*Decentralized innovation
*Experts recognition and
matching
*Adoption of any new IT
platform
Existing underperforming Barter - we design and
solutions that suffer from develop information
adoption problem markets mechanism to
'Knowledge management
platforms
'internal social network
platforms
'internal ideation platforms
'Examples: Yammer, Sharepoint,
Brainstorm, Jive, Salesforce,
IBM Connection
'Fix the incentive issues of
existing platforms
*Recognizing and supporting the
usage of virtual currency
'Provide innovative and robust
solutions to organizational
challenges
KJKJK~)
Design of Information
Markets. How to make
the market work?
'Market design for information
products
eAdvanced mechanism design to
solve some unique challenges
Figure 2-1: Development of the problem space - how knowledge-related challenges and
failure of existing solutions lead to this dissertation research
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1.b - Expertise Recognition & Matching - This is a bidirectional problem: given a
talent inside an organization, how to identify, recognize and promote his domains of
expertise; given a problem, how to route it to the most suitable expert to solve it;
1.c - Decentralized Innovation - Instead of a top-down approach for innovation, how
to decentralize the innovation process to all participatory members to collect creative
minds, and execute the best ideas;
1.d - Adoption of IT Platforms - Two challenges are outstanding when an organiza-
tion adopts a new IT platform: 1) Early user adoption - solving the chicken-and-egg
problem, and 2) Justification on the ROI (Return on Investment).
The ultimate purposes of meeting these challenges are to 1) enhance knowledge workers'
productivity, and 2) enhance an organization's competitiveness. [17] reports solid statisti-
cal evidence that accessing knowledge markets indeed enhances productivity gains. These
challenges have been recognized and they have remained outstanding for decades. Proposed
solutions flourish as technology evolves.
2.3.2 Step 2 - Challenges of Today's Existing Solutions
A plethora of software solutions, either as consumer products or enterprise ones, are de-
signed and implemented to tackle aforementioned challenges. In this dissertation research,
we focus more on an organizational setting and addressing knowledge-related problems in-
side an organization boundary. At the time of writing this dissertation, enterprise 2.0,
sometimes referred to as enterprise social network or enterprise collaboration platform, has
gained tremendous popularity and is dominating the solution space. They have achieved
effectiveness to various degrees, but they often face the following challenges [14]:
2.a - Incentive - The lack of incentive to participate, contribute and share of knowledge
is still the most significant and outstanding challenge, which lies at the center of the
problem space, and is the primary focus of this research.
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In addition to continuously improved features and user experiences, most of today's software
solutions rely on incentives that are characterized as "social incentives" to attract and retain
users. They include:
" Altruism
" Reputation
" Expertise recognition
" Self-learning
" Social interaction - maintaining friendship and making new friends
* Achievement / Fulfillment
" Organization guidelines and requirements
While social incentives are effective to a certain degree, adding economic incentives will
further solidify the strength of the incentive structure and maximize the "pie" - the amount
of knowledge creation and sharing within a platform. We also sometimes refer to economic
incentives as "market incentives" or "material incentives". We will use these phrases in-
terchangeably in future discussions. A key research question is - how do we design market
incentives in a pro-social manner? As we know, introducing market norms to a platform
incautiously might jeopardize established social norms, which are difficult to recover once
destroyed [2].
Other challenges faced by existing solutions include:
2.b - Noise, Clamoring for Attention - Not all information is relevant or valuable to
a user. Too much information that demands attention creates too much noise that
results in a reduction in productivity;
2.c - Little Managerial Control - When the platform experiences problems, there is a
lack of effective managerial tools or instruments to influence the system and introduce
corrections;
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Table 2.1: Real-world Examples: Two Incentive Schemes Designed by Two Firms
Firm 1 - Use Frequent Flier Miles Firm 2 - Use Corporate Shares
e Installing Lotus Notes and reading a * Answering an urgent request: 3
posting: 4,000 miles shares
e Posting a useful resource for others e Developing customer, technology or
to share: 2,000 miles market bids: 10 shares
* Posting a request for assistance: 9 Contributing solutions and success
1,000 miles stories: 20 shares
e Posting a response to a request for
help: 500 miles
2.3.3 Step 3 - Challenges in Incentive Design
Some organizations recognize the importance of combining market incentives and attempt
various schemes of providing material rewards. However, a top-down approach often gets
it wrong. Consider the following real-world examples - two sets of incentive rules designed
by two firms are presented in Table 2.1.
In these two sets of incentive rules, firms used "fixed rewards" schemes, or "fixed-pricing"
elicitation by presetting the price of needed knowledge objects or activities without re-
specting their true value. As a result of fixed-pricing, experts with knowledge that is more
valuable than the given price would not contribute it to the platform. On the other side,
novices flood the system with low-quality information just to collect rewards. In addition,
the incentives came from merely one-time campaign that was not sustainable. After the
promotion period, users lost the incentive to come back to the system, and knowledge got
outdated and obsolete soon afterwards.
These two examples reveal two challenges:
3.a - Fixed Pricing - How to avoid fixed pricing for knowledge and user activities. On
the contrary, how to reward users based on the true value of knowledge they con-
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tribute? Two relevant problems are: 1) How to measure the value of knowledge? 2)
How to avoid micro-management of a platform?
3.b - Long-term incentives - How to construct long-term sustainable incentives instead
of one-time short-term promotion? How to maintain and manage an appropriate
incentive level along time?
Designing rewards using a centralized top-down approach by putting fixed prices on goods
and services leads to mis-allocation of resources and inefficiency. On a knowledge platform,
users are under-incentivized to participate and knowledge is under-created.
An alternative efficient mechanism is to enable a true peer-to-peer marketplace for knowl-
edge products. Let the price float and rely on the "invisible hands" to balance supply and
demand of knowledge products and determine the real value of knowledge. It is proven in
the real-world that a market-based economy achieves greater efficiency of resource allocation
and maximizes the "pie" compared with a centrally-planned economy. In a market-based
economy, the government, the manager of the economy, does not directly influence how
prices of goods and services are determined. Instead, the government devises and imple-
ments rules and regulations to guarantee the fairness and efficiency of the market, and exerts
fiscal policies to invest in products and services that are under-created in a decentralized
economy such as fundamental research and public services.
A major contribution of this dissertation research is to apply established economic prac-
tice and theories to knowledge platforms in an innovative way. We aim at constructing a
true marketplace for knowledge products in order to value knowledge accurately and max-
imize knowledge creation and sharing. The "governor" of the knowledge platform does not
manage the platform by directly interfering with user activities. Instead, the "governor"
monitors and guards the integrity and fairness of knowledge markets and exerts influences
by executing economic policies.
In the two examples introduced above, frequent flies miles and corporate shares are virtually
used as currency to measure knowledge value and deliver material rewards. Currency-based
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incentive design is gaining popularity on many platforms. Using currency to facilitate
incentive design, either virtual or real, has the following advantages:
" Currency serves as transaction medium, which provides convenience for exchanges of
different knowledge objects and transactions. Thus, currency is absolutely necessary
for building a true knowledge marketplace and economy;
" Currency enables accurate tracking of contribution, expertise, and reputation on dif-
ferent domains;
" Currency enables advanced economic tools for managers to control, moderate, and
grow the platform, and modify user behaviors;
" Currency naturally comes with fun & gamification aspects to engage users.
Therefore, currency not only provides economic incentives, but also strengthens social incen-
tives by calibrating measurement of contribution and reputation. Once we back up currency
with what users deem valuable, economic incentives are provided through currency.
Other non-knowledge-based platforms often use currency to engage users and build incen-
tives as well. Frequent flier miles, credit card reward points, dropbox.com on-line storage,
SecondLife Linden Dollars, gold coins in computer games are all examples of currency. They
are effective in engaging users and getting them rewarded. Campaign promotions such as
"Triple miles for flights in XXX season between City A and City B", or "Double bonus
storage space for referring a friend to register" are realizations of currency-based economic
tools to modify user behaviors, which would be difficult to implement without currency.
For knowledge platforms, currency-based design is extending its popularity and adoption.
For instance, stackoverflow.com uses reputation points to track users' contribution and
expertise, and starts to make them fungible; on quora.com, users can earn and spend "Quora
Credits" to promote their questions and acquire attention from experts. Such platforms,
when designing reward rules based on currency, still often adopt and deploy fixed-pricing
rules, and fail to measure value of knowledge or user activities properly. Managing currency
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supply and backing up the value of currency are prominent challenges as well, which we
cover in the next section.
2.3.4 Step 4 - Challenges in Designing Knowledge Markets & Economy
From the discussion above, designing knowledge markets supported by associated "knowl-
edge currency" promises an effective mechanism to tackle challenges on knowledge plat-
forms, especially on incentives. Based on this argument, we face a new set of challenges
when designing knowledge currency and markets.
Currency-related challenges include:
4.a - Backing up Currency Value - How to provide currency with value that users
care about inside and outside the knowledge platform?
4.b - Managing Currency Supply - Oversupplying currency causes inflation and jeop-
ardizes users' appreciation of currency value; under-supplying currency discourages
economic activities which undermines knowledge creation and sharing. Currency
growth should thus be maintained at an optimal level. How to inject / extract cur-
rency into /from the knowledge economy without negative effects?
4.c - Pricing & Valuing Knowledge - How to measure the value of 1) knowledge ob-
jects and 2) various types of user activities, denominated in knowledge currency, so
that users get rewarded fairly? The peculiar properties of knowledge objects, i.e.
characteristics of information products, make pricing and valuation challenging.
Designing an efficient and effective marketplace for knowledge objects presents a unique set
of challenges, primarily due to the special nature of knowledge products.
4.d - General Market-design Principles - A knowledge market needs to first meet
necessary conditions required by any generic market to be successful and efficient.
Fig.2-2 lists four general market design principles and how we follow them in our
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Market Thickness
- Requirement -There are opportunities to trade with a wide range of
potential transactors.
- Barter's design - 1) Multiple types of information markets; 2)
Primary and secondary markets; 3) World bank serves as a transactor
in some cases.
Lack of Congestion
- Requirement - Market is rapid, participants can feasibly turn down
offers in order to see better matches.
- Barter design - 1) Information seekers make offers; 2) Information
providers can negotiate prices, and are rewarded fairly in the long-
term; 3) market making is performed by algorithms in the secondary
markets.
Mlarket Saferv
- Requirement - Avoid strategic interaction which might undermine
allocative efficiency and social welfare
- Barter design - 1) a self-governing/regulating mechanism based on
crowd wisdom plus market incentives; 2) the infrastructure tracks all
suspicious activities and transactions; 3) organizational hierarchy
limits frauds.
. Requirement -Market trade is not undermined by other social values
which limit the ability to charge positive prices for a good.
- Barter design - provides both social and economic incentives,
encourages pro-social behaviors on the platform.
Figure 2-2: Market design principles followed and implemented in Barter.
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design. They include: 1) market thickness, 2) lack of congestion, 3) market safety,
and 4) management of repugnance, presented in [13][24];
4.e - Information Asymmetry - Asymmetric information about the quality of to-be-
exchanged knowledge products, and asymmetric information about the knowledge
buyers' commitment to pay make the transaction difficult to proceed. How does the
market facilitate transactions by minimizing information asymmetry?
4.f - Market Fraud and Abuse - Users tend to attempt to outsmart market designers
and gain an unfair advantage by gaming the system. How do we design fraud pre-
vention mechanism to clean fraudulent behaviors, sustain fairness, and protect the
integrity of the market from abuse?
4.g - Behavioral Modification - Platform managers often want to promote certain be-
haviors. For example, as mentioned before, extended knowledge objects (EKO) are
critical to knowledge valuation, indexing and sorting, but are also often under-created.
How do we apply policies to modify users' behaviors so that they do more voting or
tagging? Fixed-pricing again usually renders adverse outcomes.
4.h - Currency Hoarding - Preventing currency hoarding falls under the category of
behavioral modification, but it deserves emphasis as a separate item. In other words,
how do we create incentives for spending? An unsustainable saving rate leads to low
activities and causes the knowledge economy stagnant.
In previous sections, we have explained in detail the logic and derivation process of the
problem space. We start from knowledge-related challenges inside organizations, and end
up with tackling specific research questions on the design of knowledge currency, markets,
and economic policies.
2.4 Review Challenges of Knowledge Platforms
We review and summarize challenges faced by knowledge platforms that rely on user-
generated contents (UGC). Some overlap with the ones introduced above. Generally speak-
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Eliciting Validating Quantifying
* Locate sources of e Gauge relevance * Measure direct content value
relevant knowledge * identify obsolete e Measure effects of applying
* Get people to contribute content content
Figure 2-3: Challenges faced by knowledge platforms that rely on user-generated contents
(UGC)
ing, most knowledge platforms face challenges that can be categorized into three phases, as
shown in Fig.2-3[4]:
Phase 1 - Elicitation
* Get the platform to take off by solving the chicken-and-egg problem: Knowledge
consumers do not participate unless there is enough knowledge stored; knowledge
producers do not contribute unless there are knowledge consumers and they get
fairly rewarded; Early adoption of a new platform is also addressed in the subject
of platform economics;
e Locate sources of relevant knowledge: given a request for knowledge, how to
locate experts within an organization who owns the knowledge;
Phase 2 - Validation
* Identify obsolete contents, update or correct knowledge. In short, the platform
oughts to maintain the quality of knowledge constantly;
e Gauge relevance of knowledge for targeted users to minimize noise;
Phase 3 - Measurement
e Measure the value of knowledge objects, possibly denominated using both knowl-
edge currency and real currency;
e Measure an individual user's contribution, and expertise on different areas.
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Let us revisit the original problem statement:
For a knowledge platform built upon crowd-sourcing and user-generated con-
tents, how do we incentive users to participate, share and contribute?
After our previous discussion on knowledge currency, markets, and economic policies, we
transform and reshape the problem as:
How to turn a knowledge platform into a vigorous "knowledge economy"?
Inside a "knowledge economy",
9 Users create knowledge in a decentralized way through knowledge market exchanges;
e Users get fairly rewarded by earning and spending knowledge currency;
e Managers stimulate system growth using "macroeconomic" and "fiscal" policies;
e Knowledge-related challenges can be tackled using advanced tools.
2.5 Summary
The purpose of this chapter is not merely to enumerate all the problems and challenges,
but also demonstrate the evolution of the problem space and interdependency among all
challenges and research questions. This allows us to clearly differentiate our innovation and
contribution in this dissertation.
To summarize the innovation and contribution from this research - we have designed a com-
plete framework of a knowledge economy, which consists of three critical modules: knowl-
edge currency, knowledge market mechanisms, and economic policies. We will discuss on
system architecture in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
System Architecture
3.1 Overview
In this chapter, we present in detail the complete design of the Barter knowledge economy
framework. We illustrate key concepts and design choices by using diagrams and screen
shots from the software. The goal of this dissertation research is to design and build a
knowledge economy for an organization or a community to address various organizational
challenges on knowledge sharing and decentralized innovation, particularly on constructing
incentives.
For clarification on terminology and future presentation, "Barter" is a term we use to refer
to multiple concepts: 1) the software platform we build, 2) the design and architecture
of the knowledge economy framework we present in the research. The subtle difference
between "knowledge markets" and "information markets" might introduce some confusion.
We do not attempt to seek unambiguous differentiation between the two concepts in this
dissertation. Both phrases refer to the same mechanism for exchanging a special type of
products - information products. Also, "knowledge markets" are constituent components
of a "knowledge economy", which also includes currency, user activities, economic policies
and various types of entities, etc. For the convenience of presentation, in the following
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chapters we use terms "Barter", "information markets", "knowledge markets", "knowledge
economy" interchangeably, the meanings of which should be self-evident from their contexts.
What is Barter? Broadly speaking, Barter creates an "information economy" or a "knowl-
edge economy" inside an organization or a community. Barter consists of three key compo-
nents in its architecture: 1) knowledge currency, 2) knowledge market mechanism, and 3)
economic policies for influencing the knowledge economy. The following statements give a
birds-eye view of Barter's key features and strengths
o Barter is a market-incented wisdom exchange, or simply speaking, an information
market, designed for organizations and communities to maximize the creation, reuse,
and sharing of knowledge and innovation among members;
o Barter is capable of tackling the peculiar properties of information such as non-rivalry
and non-excludability when constructing a market for information products;
o Barter provides long-term sustainable incentives to reward knowledge contributors
and encourage participation;
o Barter deploys multiple types of information markets to address different organiza-
tional challenges, such as Q&A, document sharing, idea genesis;
o Barter provides a mechanism to monitor and govern the economy, and apply macroe-
conomic and fiscal policies to influence its operation and modify users' behaviors;
o Barter completes the market by providing a product auction market where virtual
currency can be exchanged for material goods, thus providing a mechanism to calculate
the exchange rate between the Barter knowledge economy and real-world economy;
o Barter can accurately measure the value of information created sorted by users and by
topics, and measure users' reputation, contribution and expertise on different topics;
such measurement can be denominated using both Barter currency and real-world
currency;
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" Barter is capable of self-governing, self-correcting, and self-improving by using inno-
vative crowd-sourcing mechanism;
" Barter provides solutions to common challenges on IT platforms using innovative
market-based approaches. Examples of these challenges include early user adoption
and platform growth, market abuse and fraud;
" Barter is an internal social platform with fun and gaming aspects associated with it.
From a mechanism design perspective, Barter presents an innovative framework to tackle
knowledge-related challenges, which consists of virtual knowledge currency, markets, and
a set of rules and polices to meet the design goal. From a technical perspective, Barter
provides an isolated technology engine stack, which implements the three aforementioned
key modules, and can be interfaced with existing knowledge platforms to enhance them, as
shown in Fig.3-2.
3.2 System Architecture
Before touching upon how each individual market or module works on Barter, we first
present the overall system architecture, as depicted in Fig.3-1.
The infrastructure of Barter can be broadly divided into three crucial components:
Knowledge Currency - the virtual currency designed for exchanging knowledge. Users
use knowledge currency to track contribution, reputation, and expertise on different
topics, and can cash it out for material rewards. Managers of a platform use knowledge
currency to measure information value, and use currency as tools to influence overall
activities, introduce stimulation and modify user behaviors.
Knowledge Market Mechanism - the central pieces of which are multiple types of
knowledge markets, where knowledge objects are created, exchanged (traded), and
managed, such as Q&A, document, idea markets. These knowledge markets are
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The knowledge economy
Figure 3-1: System architecture of the complete Barter knowledge economy framework -
from a mechanism design perspective.
Barter's own services &
user interfaces I
Other 3 Sart
knowledge platforms
The presentation layer
Barter API Platform
CurecyMarket Mechanism Economic Policies
Our core technology layer
Figure 3-2: System architecture of the complete Barter knowledge economy framework
from a technology perspective.
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tangible modules that directly provide user experiences. The rules and regulations
that govern the running of these marketplaces are designed and implemented by the
"Knowledge Market Engine" layer. Built on top of the system hierarchy is an inter-
esting but powerful layer called "derivative market" of information, also introduced
later in Table 3.2. It is built upon information securitization and fair distribution.
Derivative information markets address big challenges such as incentives for spending
and insufficient liquidity of markets. There are also four critical peripheral modules
that guard and enhance the knowledge markets:
Fraud Prevention - a crowd-sourcing mechanism where the detection, reporting,
and conviction of market fraud and abuse is done by all market participants;
Attention Market - a mechanism to prevent information oversupply and spam,
and enhance relevance of provided information to a user. A user's attention
should not always be acquired for free, but should be obtained based on a fee
that is calculated based on social connections and expertise level on an area;
Reuse Tracking - a module that captures the spillover effects of knowledge and
helps measure the value of information. This module tracks reuse of knowledge
objects based on their observable attributes and generate a reuse score for each
knowledge object;
Credit Tracking - a module that is similar to the Reuse Tracking module, but
is designed specifically to track credit sharing and assignment among document
authors, where the overlapping portions of documents are tracked and measured;
Economic Polices are novel tools and devices designed for platform managers to control
and maintain the health of the knowledge economy, and intervene when necessary. The
set of policies are designed and provided based upon established economic theories
and practice, and constitute Barter's differentiating vision and strength. Economic
polices can be broadly categorized into
Monetary Policies refer to the practice that the "Central Bank" of the knowledge
economy stimulates / controls the economy by injecting / subtracting currency
into / out of the economy;
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Fiscal Policies refer to revenue generation and spending by the "government". On
Barter, we refer to the "government" as the "Planner". There are certain types
of activities and behaviors that can only be promoted by central spending, such
as rewarding knowledge reuse, encouraging voting / tagging.
The descriptions above aim at providing a high-level overview of Barter's architecture. One
important mission of this research is to treat the subject of knowledge currency, markets
and associated incentive design thoroughly, and provide a complete framework design of the
knowledge economy covering all interplaying factors. Treating an individual sub-module
alone tends to lead to deficient design choices. In the following sections, we cover each of
the three components and their constituent modules in greater details.
3.3 Knowledge Currency
3.3.1 Overview and Discussion on Incentive Design
Sustained participation in online communities and markets is driven by mixed and het-
erogeneous motives. They generally fall into three categories: (1) Social rewards include
peer-recognition and professional reputation,(2) intellectual rewards include learning and
problem-solving and (3) material rewards include virtual points, money and a variety of
other benefits[4][5].
Users on Barter can spend their virtual currency either on information they need or on
tangible rewards through the auction market. Barter adopts a floating-price mechanism.
Information seekers raise offered rewards for critical issues that require more efforts to pro-
vide. Information owners choose whether to supply it given the current price, or directly
negotiate with information seekers. The auction market provides an organization's manage-
ment a layer to isolate material incentives from classifying and evaluating knowledge created
inside the platform. Exchanges of all types of information products are denominated in vir-
tual currency, the value of which is determined separately by market users through their
activities in each market.
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Figure 3-3: Two-layer framework for virtual currency design - Separation between currency
usage and currency backup (I: Internal backup, E: External backup)
Instead of offering a one-time lump-sum reward, an organization can distribute material
rewards through the auction market in a continuous and strategic way. Depending on
several key economic indicators, such as user activities, price indexes and currency supplies,
the "chief economist" of Barter can determine the density and value of the products posted
in the auction market. While used to provide material incentives, the auction market is
also an important mechanism to stimulate or stabilize the entire knowledge economy.
We follow an important mechanism design principle that using / earning virtual currency
inside the knowledge economy and backing up the virtual currency in order to provide real
value to users are separated and isolated into two independent layers, as demonstrated in
Fig.3-3. Such a layered framework allows us to tackle one problem without worrying about
the other one.
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Economic activities inside markets are facilitated and denominated using commonly ac-
cepted currency inside an economy. In order for the currency to be recognized and accepted
in a knowledge economy, organizations need to develop plans to backup the virtual currency
to provide real and material value to the currency so that users have incentives to earn and
use the virtual currency. Designing and deploying such a backup plan can be isolated from
the problem of how currency should be used inside the knowledge economy to maximize
knowledge / innovation creation.
On the top layer, when we design market rules and mechanisms, we can make the assumption
that users care about earning more virtual currency, and building economic incentives for an
individual user is abstracted as earning currency. We use virtual currency as units and tools
to moderate economic activities inside the knowledge economy, and to encourage behaviors
we want to promote.
3.3.2 Currency Value
For an individual user, willingness to earn more currency by performing various activities in
the information markets and economy serves as the basis for incentive design. If users are
not willing to accumulate more currency, the entire incentive structure cannot be sustained.
As demonstrated in Fig.3-3, a user's willingness to own and earn currency is supported by
the following characteristics of knowledge currency:
" Currency serves as the transactional medium inside the knowledge economy. In order
to do any type of spending such as eliciting knowledge or acquiring experts' attention,
users need the same type of currency to do so;
" Earned amount of currency on specific topics or domains serve as reputation scores
or count towards expertise status;
" Users can exchange virtual currency for physical products. On the product auction
market, every user can post real products / services in exchange for virtual points,
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and other users can bid on the product following an auction mechanism that is similar
as eBay's. Note that in this case, the total amount of currency supply is unchanged.
In addition to the implied value and utility of currency listed above, organizations (firms)
can further strengthen the value of virtual currency by designing other backup plans. Or-
ganizations can be creative on how to back up currency value. For example:
" Organizations purchase real gifts / products and post them in the auction market
for sale, such as iPad, company t-shirts, mugs, etc. (the scarcity of which makes
themselves more appreciated and effective);
" Organizations can devise titles to encourage competition, such as "the knight of
Barter" as a fun example;
e Associate the amount of earned currency with honors and rewards, such as names
mentioned on corporate web portal or having lunch with the CEO;
" Directly associate earned points with performance review or compensation.
By posting material gifts / products on the auction market, organizations effectively spend
real dollars to back up the virtual currency. Moreover, this mechanism achieves several
important goals:
Currency Extraction Organizations take currency out of circulation and put them back
into the "central bank";
Measure Exchange-rate We are able to approximate the exchange rate between virtual
currency and real dollar value by linear regression between product value of posted
items and transaction prices in virtual currency. The exchange rate allows us to
further measure the value of knowledge created inside the entire knowledge economy;
Monetary Policies Organizations can have discretionary spending on stimulation of the
knowledge economy, thus providing a long-term sustainable incentive structure.
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The product auction market "completes" the knowledge markets. It has significant impacts
on the design of economic policies, which will be covered later.
3.3.3 Currency Supply & Velocity
As mentioned in earlier chapters, quantity theory of money establishes a relationship among
currency supply, velocity of currency, price levels and total production in an economy
M-V=P-Q (3.1)
where M is the total amount of currency supply in the economy, V is the velocity of currency
in final expenditure, Q represents the real output, and P is the corresponding price level.
From this relationship, we learn that economic activities and price levels can be influenced
by adjusting currency supply and turnover rate in the economy. In general, we wish to
" maintain a stable amount of currency supply M with a steady target growth rate gc;
" increase the velocity of currency V.
The goal is to maximize the total knowledge production and maintain fairness in the knowl-
edge economy.
Managing currency velocity has direct implications on virtual currency design. One effective
and commonly recognized approach to control currency velocity is to manage currency
expiration. Currency holders are motivated to spend the currency before expiration time
rather than render the currency useless. In practice, it is often challenging to do a fine-
grained control over currency expiration because of the difficulty involved to track the usage
and expiration of each currency unit. For example, in real world economies, currency almost
never expires. In the digital world, the expiration of virtual currency is well recognized and
popularly adopted for similar purposes, and virtual currency expires often following a simple
expiration schedule such as frequency flier miles of major airlines.
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When designing and optimizing the expiration rules, we need to make trade-offs on two
critical factors:
Simplicity We must take users' perception to currency expiration into consideration. A
theoretically optimal but complicated currency expiration scheme discourages users
from participation. Therefore, we need an expiration scheme that is simple enough,
and present it to users through intuitive interfaces;
Frequency/Period If the expiration period is too long, it is not effective in driving users
to spend; if the expiration period is too short, users need to pay too much attention
to currency management, the opportunity cost of which may be too high for users
compared with the importance of their other daily activities.
On Barter, thanks to the serialized design of currency, we are able to adopt sophisticated
currency control over each individual unit. For currency used in the virtual economy con-
trolled and managed by software, we can track the type, status and ownership of each unit
of currency easily, and apply different expiration rules.
Barter, as a software platform, serves as an ideal testbed to search for the best expiration
rule that optimizes currency velocity and overall knowledge production.
3.3.4 Currency & Transaction Design
When designing virtual currency and transactions following our previous discussions, we
first need a basic set of features:
" Transactions, and associated currencies, have basic security, failsafe and rollback fea-
tures. The integrity of every transaction needs to be protected;
" Transactions have different types depending on their purposes and other factors; they
can be filtered, aggregated, and analyzed easily;
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" Currency gets "minted" by the "Central Bank" and issued based on the requirement
of monetary policies;
" Users have their individual bank accounts, and there is a special entity named the
"Central Bank" for employing monetary policies; the "Central Bank" has its own
account;
" Transactions can be taxed, fees can be charged on user accounts. In other words,
basic accounting practice should be enabled.
For the knowledge economy, we also need some advanced features:
" Currency is serialized, which means each unit of currency is a separate object with
its unique identification and ownership, for each transaction we not only track the
lump-sum amount, but also specify which units of currency change hands; this allows
us to have fine-grained control over currency behaviors;
" Each unit of currency has its own type (there are multiple types of currency), and its
own expiration schedule. Currency type and expiration schedule get updated when
the unit changes hands with a transaction;
" The history of each unit of currency can be traced accurately;
The platform periodically performs "knowledge accounting". Transactions within the knowl-
edge economy are all associated with knowledge objects. The value of total knowledge cre-
ated, the expertise score of a user on different fields, leader boards, reputation signals as
knowledge buyers or sellers all get updated as transactions occur. Some of these can be up-
dated in real-time right after transactions occur, some can only be updated asynchronously
following a periodic schedule when certain attributes of the associated knowledge object
tend to change over time.
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3.4 Market Engines
A market engine unambiguously defines
" Specifications of products / services that are permitted to be exchanged in the market;
e Rules two-sided market participants must obey for the market to run efficiently and
prevent failure;
" Specifications on how products / services are delivered;
" Specifications on how a transaction is initiated and completed;
" How market participants feed information back into the market itself to improve the
market efficiency;
From a technology and software design perspective, a market engine serves as a middle-
ware that provides generic interfaces to different types of information markets and therefore
information products, and communicates with other system modules such as user profiles
and currency / transaction modules.
For example, ebay.com provides an auction-based market engine for tangible products and
services; Nasdaq is an electronic market platform for trading equity stocks where a transac-
tion automatically gets initiated when a "bid" and an "ask" get matched; Google Answers
was an online marketplace where Internet users paid to get their questions answered by
"Google researchers"; Intrade.com is a prediction market where users trade a special type
of security whose value is determined by the binary outcome of a real-world event. Among
these different market instances, each market has its own mechanisms, rules, and permitted
products & services, which constitute its distinctive "market engine".
Our goal is to abstract commonalities and generic components from different markets, and
define a minimum set of core reusable market engines that support different information
markets. Key differentiating factors in determining a market engine in information markets
include:
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Information properties of Exchanged Products & Services Whether products / ser-
vices traded on the market exhibit strong characteristics of information;
Standardization of Exchanged Products & Services Whether products / services are
customized and heterogeneous or they are standardized across the market;
Reputation Mechanism How critically a successful transaction relies on the reputation
of providers of products / services. When information products are exchanged, two
parties of the transaction need to deal with information asymmetry, and reputation
alleviates the problem as a "signaling" mechanism.
Preview and Feedback Before a transaction occurs, how does the market enable the
buyers to preview and evaluate the products before making a purchase decision? This
is a key challenge for information products due to the nonexcludability nature of
information. After a transaction occurs, how do we enable two parties of a transaction
to provide feedbacks to the transaction to strengthen the reputation mechanism and
reduce information asymmetry in future?
The list of factors are not independent but correlated surrounding the key factor - whether
the products exchanged in the market exhibit strong information characteristics. In the
context of organizational information markets designed to address organizational challenges,
we have identified four core market engines. On top of the four market engines, we can
build different types of markets for different purposes.
The list of market engines and their supported markets are depicted in Fig.3-4. How
each market engine is differentiated, what properties each market possesses, and how they
support various markets in addressing different organizational challenges are covered in
detail in following subsections quadrant by quadrant. In this dissertation, we mainly focus
on the market engine for information products.
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Figure 3-4: Four market engines of Barter and their supported markets
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3.4.1 Market Engine for Information Products
The market engine for exchanging "information products" is the most challenging and
crucial one, where the peculiar characteristics of information make markets prone to failure.
Three types of markets can be supported by the market engine for information products
Question & Answer (Q&A) Market A platform for peer-to-peer assistance, pairing
experts with novices, matching expertise with problems. The Q&A market gener-
ates prompt responses.
Document Market An exchange that encourages document sharing and reuse, and tracks
credits for authorship.
Innovation (Idea) Market A marketplace for generating, combining, ranking, and pro-
moting ideas based on open contribution and decentralized innovation. The platform
also matches complex R&D problems with a network of problem solvers.
Barter is a market of a special type - an information market - where users exchange ideas
the value of which are difficult to judge prior to disclosure. However, Barter first needs
to adhere to general principles of market design, as summarized in Fig.2-2. These four
principles should be satisfied in order to have almost any type of information market run
stably and efficiently [13][24].
Next, when the exchanged goods in a market are information products, the following charac-
teristics of information need to be carefully taken into consideration when designing Barter,
as illustrated in Table 3.1. Otherwise, the market is prone to failure. An in-depth mech-
anism design and feature descriptions of each market are covered in later sections. These
three markets are grouped together and supported by the same market engine is because
they exhibit similar characteristics, mainly based on the fact that goods exchanged in these
markets are typical "information" products - answers, documents, innovative ideas or R&D
solutions. Peculiar properties of information introduce the following practical challenges to
the market design:
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Table 3.1: Challenges of Information Products and Barter's Solutions
Characteristics
of Information
Products
Information
and innovation
has spillover
effects, and is
non-excludable
Information is
costly to create
and costless to
replicate
Evaluation of
information re-
quires accessing
non-excludable
information first
Barter's Design and Solutions
1. The spillover effects should not be treated nega-
tively in the context of organizational knowledge shar-
ing and innovation creation. A more important issue
is to reward information creators fairly; 2. We have
devised algorithms to track information reuse, trace
back contributors, and reward them fairly. 3. We
encourage pro-social behaviors to reward information
providers, such as tipping.
1. The fair distribution mechanism guarantees that
original information creators get continuously re-
warded for providing valuable information; 2. A
market-based approach for the detection of fraud and
copyright infringement; 3. Several mechanisms are in
place to protect information providers. For example,
answerers in the Q&A market can choose to hide their
answers until the question expires.
1. Rewards are offered by information seekers upfront,
and are frozen by the "Central Bank" to enforce pay-
ment and allocation. 2. Information seekers get pe-
nalized for ignoring to judge information quality and
distribute rewards, and charged for extending the ex-
piration time.
Non-excludability Information is non-excludable. Before a transaction of information oc-
curs, evaluation of information by the buyer makes the transaction no longer necessary
since the buyer already acquires the information.
Non-rivalry Consumption of information by one buyer does not prevent another user from
enjoying the benefits of the knowledge. Information or innovation has the spillover
effects, which makes the pricing of information challenging given the long-term impli-
cations of knowledge reuse. In order to decide to render knowledge to the platform, the
seller of information requires an accurate pricing signal that reflects both immediate
needs and long-term spillover effects.
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We next present the mechanisms of the Q&A market in great detail. The goal is to show
how the information-product market engine is integrated and used to support a particular
type of knowledge products - questions & answers. We then briefly introduce the other
two knowledge markets that are supported by the same engine. We have implemented and
deployed them as key modules in the Barter software.
Question & Answer (Q&A) Market
This is an information market that allows users to ask questions to the Barter community
and expect prompt answers. We emphasize on how mechanisms and design principles of
the information-products market engine are instantiated in the Q&A market. Document
and Innovation markets are both supported by the same engine, which have many rules and
mechanisms in common.
The basic Q&A market interactions among users proceed as follows:
1. Each time a user asks a question, she can opt to post X points as bounty, or her
"willingness to pay (WTP)", and optionally an expiration date by which all answers
must be received in order to be considered as reward recipients;
2. Other users visiting this page who have the same question can "sponsor" the question
by supplementing more rewards as their "willing to pay (WTP)". The pool of points
combining multiple askers' WTP serve as signals to knowledge owners to incentivize
them to provide answers;
3. Answerers provide answers in two ways: without or with price tags, in which the first
is usually encouraged in an organizational environment advocating open knowledge
sharing:
Free When an answerer provides an answer without setting a price, the content is
freely accessible to other users in its entirety;
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Non-free When an answer is guarded with a price tag, all other users, including the
askers, need to pay a larger amount than the given price in order to access the
content; Before making sufficient payment, other users can only access a preview
of the content, which is automatically computed and displayed by the system;
4. When the question gets close to expiration, the asker and other endorsers who have
committed WTP can review received answers and distribute reward funds among
answerers based on perceived quality of answers. All askers with WTP committed
can end up with paying more than signaled, or they can withdraw all or part of
the committed rewards for any reasons such as they feel unsatisfied with provided
answerers.
There are important mechanisms in place to minimize information asymmetry that threat-
ens knowledge transactions. From the perspective of answerers, how to guarantee that
askers have the capacity, i.e. enough funds in the account, to fulfill commitment, and
deliver payment after answers are supplied?
Credit Freeze When a user makes a WTP commitment eliciting knowledge, the corre-
sponding amount of funds gets "frozen" in the bank account and gets associated with
the particular knowledge request. She cannot spend the frozen funds or use them to
commit another WTP. Frozen points get unfrozen when transactions happen or the
user decides to claim them back;
Buyers Reputation Askers can claim back their committed points with a transaction
tax as penalty. The system keeps a record tracking every user's history of WTP
on knowledge requests and how much they really deliver as payments to knowledge
providers. The ratio of delivery over WTP is associated with the user's profile and
serves as a reputation signal for potential knowledge providers;
Onetime Earning vs. Longterm Reuse Award An important mechanism as part of
the market engine is reuse tracking that captures information spillover effects. The
potential answerer does not necessarily need to be wary about the askers' reputation
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on fulfilling payment, but instead focus on delivering high-quality contents. Future
income from reuse of the answer can generate fair returns.
From the perspective of askers, when answers are guarded with price, strong information
asymmetry occurs. Askers hesitate to make payment before understanding the quality of
answers. However, due to the non-excludability property of knowledge products, disclosing
contents upfront is unrealistic either, since it lets askers consume the knowledge for free and
unmotivated to deliver payment. Screening and signaling prove to be effective in tacking
information asymmetry. More concretely:
Preview The system generates a preview of the content, which is freely accessible. Exam-
ples include random snippets of texts, a thumbnail of uploaded pictures or files;
Sellers Reputation The system tracks how many points each user earns on each specific
area (tag) in the Q&A market and across all knowledge markets, and synthesizes an ex-
pertise profile from all past knowledge transactions. The expertise profile is presented
to potential buyers so that they understand whether the answerer has demonstrated
sufficient expertise in related fields (tags) before making a purchase;
Feedback on Sellers A potential buyer can access previous buyer's comments and voting
on the answer before making a purchase decision. After making the purchase, the
buyer is prompted to provide similar feedbacks for future buyers, and is reminded to
do so periodically;
3rd-party Ratings As the platform evolves, trusted members can form 3rd-party rating
agencies evaluating answers' quality and provide ratings and opinions on knowledge
objects as an objective certificate. They can charge fees for their time and efforts.
Members should earn enough credits and authority on related fields in order to make
such an agency credible and trusted.
A user can make a bid offering less points if she thinks the answer is over-priced. The seller
providing the answer gets notified about the offer, and can quickly decide to accept it or
turn it down. The price history is openly disclosed.
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Reuse tracking and getting knowledge contributors rewarded continually based on the long-
term value of knowledge they create is a vital feature of Barter. In the context of the Q&A
market, reuse tracking tackles several long-lasting challenges:
Fair rewarding Rewards paid by one or multiple askers only capture the value created
for askers, a limited subset of all users. The full value of an answer is reflected by
its reuse by other users in future. The bounty posted by askers does not capture the
spillover effects of knowledge, thus emitting an incomplete price signal to knowledge
owners. Only with reuse tracking, knowledge contributors get fairly rewarded. For
the same reason, the importance of first-time payment for an answerer is weakened.
Incentives to Ask (Spend) Currency hoarding, or excessive saving, has always presented
a challenge to active markets. Despite the desire for knowledge, a user often lacks the
incentive to spend and prefers, to save points. Especially in the case of knowledge
markets, users prefer to wait for other users spend points to elicit knowledge and be
a free rider enjoying "spilled" knowledge. A great question is as valuable as great
answers. A user should get properly rewarded when her question inspires talented
brains and elicits valuable answers into the platform. A user can potentially receive
many more points in future than the points spent today as bounty, if her question is
popularly reused. This is achieved through reuse tracking and fair distribution.
Encourage Free-sharing Generally speaking, we advocate building a culture of free knowl-
edge sharing, and discourage users from putting price tags on their knowledge objects,
especially in an organizational setting. However, a true market-based economy should
allow its citizens to freely choose how they exchange knowledge they own, instead of
forcefully requiring price tags forbidden. On Barter, a positive price tag implies that
the knowledge seller decides to value the knowledge she owns in the traditional man-
ner, and her income will solely come from other users' payments. Such a price tag
disqualifies the answer from receiving reuse rewards. With reuse tracking, an answerer
has stronger incentives to post her answerers with zero-price, and can potentially re-
ceive higher rewards when the answerers become popular in future.
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Reuse tracking will be covered in detail in the mechanism design chapter. The mechanism
relies on users' collective opinions and inputs to judge the quality and popularity of a
knowledge object and calculates its reuse value. Thus, the system needs to encourage users
to contribute "extended knowledge objects (EKO)" as introduced in the previous chapter.
Voting Users do thumbing up / down on both the question and answers; Votes from users
with different levels of expertise should be treated with different weights;
Tipping Users can "tip" the answerers or the asker for their contribution as a way to show
appreciation. "Tips" present a stronger signal compared with a "thumb-up".
Commenting Users can leave threaded comments on an answer or a question. Comments
carry wisdom and generate value. They are considered as knowledge objects, and can
receive voting and tipping as well. A question, its answers, and derivative comments
on them form a tree of knowledge objects. The question is the root, and all other
answers and comments are nodes within the tree having a parent and descendants.
The number of descendants shows whether an knowledge object is popularly discussed
upon and generates good contents for the platform.
Extended knowledge objects seemingly take users simple actions to perform, but they are
often under-produced. Incentivizing users to perform these actions and provide EKO is
related to behavioral modification, which is carried out through "fiscal policies".
Within a Q&A market with thousands of participants, a question can easily get over-
whelmed and hidden by a flood of questions, and it never gets answered or even noticed.
Effectively acquiring other users' attention, especially the attention of experts in relevant
areas is essential to the efficiency of the Q&A market. A number of social-network based
solutions have been devised and attempted, such as subscribing and social forwarding, the
effectiveness of which is limited, especially when the asker and the knowledge holder are
several degrees away along their social link.
Many software platforms, Barter included, provide in-site notifications and email associa-
tion. However, sending notification messages or emails freely to all intended recipients is not
62
a feasible solution. As stated in problem 2.b, spamming or clamoring for attention creates
too much noise that annoys other users, and drags their productivity low. The "Attention"
module of Barter is designed to tackle this problem. Rather than wait for other users to
"pull" information, a user can choose to "push" instead. However, pushing information to
users who are not socially connected costs points based on the value of their attention.
On Barter, when a question is first entered into the market, based on its tags and textual
contents, Barter automatically matches a number of experts who are most likely to provide
quality answers. However, acquiring their attention is not free. Prices for experts' attention
are different and calculated based on their expertise level.
The asker can choose whether and which experts to invest in acquiring their attention.
Experts are then notified by Barter that they are requested to answer a question. They
can visit the question page, where they can decide whether to provide an answer, and
whether to claim the "attention points" or return them back to the asker. Barter tracks
their behaviors on how many attention points users choose to accept, and how often they
do provide answers. Such a record is presented on a user's profile.
There are other scenarios when a user does not require experts' attention or rely on their
expertise. Instead, a user might simply wish to promote a news item or make an announce-
ment to reach critical mass. Users can still utilize the "Attention" module to achieve this
goal. The details of the Attention module will be introduced in a later section.
Tagging, another type of EKO, plays critical roles in 1) knowledge indexing, searching,
and storage, and 2) expertise synthesis and experts matching. However, tagging is often
insufficiently and inaccurately produced. On Barter, knowledge objects can be tagged by
both original knowledge providers and the entire community as well. On the page of a
knowledge object, users can provide new tags, or vote upon existing tags provided by other
users earlier. Tags that receive most votes are considered associated with the knowledge
object. The "Planner" incentivizes and rewards users for tagging activities through fiscal
spendings.
63
Document Market
This is an exchange that allows users to request or share documents with the Barter com-
munity. Market rules and mechanisms are nearly identical to the Q&A market. A request
for documents is similar to a question in the Q&A market, and elicited documents are sim-
ilar to answers. A key difference is that on the Q&A market, answers are almost always
provided following a question, but on the document market, users can directly share or sell
documents without elicitation.
The document market is equipped with a unique module named "Credit Tracking & At-
tribution". If a document contains proportions which give rise to other related contents
on Barter, the original contributor receives a "kickback" for posting the original document.
This module represents another type of "reuse", which tracks content reuse in derived knowl-
edge work, rather than other users' consumption of contents. We will briefly introduce this
module in a later section.
Innovation (Idea) Market
This is a marketplace for innovation, and for matching solutions to problems. A user
can either submit a standalone idea or submit one in response to another user's request.
Compared with a Q&A market, the expectation on responses is less time-sensitive.
An organization uses such a market to achieve bottom-up decentralized innovation. Any
member of an organization might have creative thinking on the organization's operations,
products or activities. She can submit her ideas to the idea market, get them scrutinized,
validated and improved by other members, and receive rewards when her idea gets promoted
or executed by senior management. On the other side, management can elicit ideas and
innovative solutions to R&D problems and get members rewarded.
A problem faced by existing idea management platforms within firms is the "lack of conclu-
sion". After the initial excitement of getting their cool ideas created and deposited, users
find their ideas left untouched, and gradually lose motivation over time. On the other side,
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management lacks the time and resources to execute on collected ideas, or even carefully
examine them. On Barter, ideas can be flagged with different status, or get promoted to
higher levels, users receive points when such events occur without the idea being executed.
In the software deployment as part of this research, the idea market is used by two en-
trepreneurship courses at the university as class tools for students to exchange venture
ideas and do cross-evaluation.
Summary of Information-Products Market Engine
Q&A, document and innovation markets are three exemplary markets that are supported
by the information-product market engine. They are highlighted and illustrated because
they have wide applications inside organizations, and are fundamental components of or-
ganizational knowledge management. With the same market engine, we can design and
deploy new types of markets for other types of knowledge objects.
From the discussion above, "knowledge objects" and "requests for knowledge objects" are
sometimes interchangeable and should not be distinguished unambiguously. A request for
knowledge objects can carry wisdom itself, be appreciated, and receive rewards. Thus, it is
also treated as a knowledge object. Conversely, knowledge objects can also be posted with
bounty eliciting comments or modification suggestions. Therefore, a "knowledge object" is
the root abstract class modeling both request and non-request types of knowledge items,
which can emit both selling and buying signals.
3.4.2 Market Engine for Services
The Request & Service market and the Design (Fix) market are powered by this engine.
We will not get into its details because the service market engine is not knowledge-related,
thus not a primary focus of this dissertation. The service market engine is similar to that
of online marketplaces for tasks and small jobs such as taskrabbit.com. Services are quite
different from knowledge products. But there is also strong information asymmetry existent
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that requires sufficient signaling between the two sides. The key is to solidify the contractual
relationship.
Design Market
The purpose of the design market is to empower Barter to keep improving itself by having
new features, bug fixes, and detecting market defects through the market mechanism itself.
We also call it "design for self-design market".
The crowd of users collectively help design the market and prioritize tasks. When a user
discovers a bug, a market loophole, or needs an extra feature, she can submit it to the
design market and offer a certain number of points as rewards to developers if her idea gets
implemented. Other users can vote on the design idea to change its priority. If they deeply
like the idea and want it to be realized sooner, they can sponsor more points to the pool of
rewards. Developers prioritize all design items posted in the market based on both signals:
votes and potential rewards.
The design market is supported by the service market engine because of the contractual
relationship between users and developers.
3.4.3 Market Engine for Regular Goods
The Product Auction Market is supported by this engine. The market engine is similar to
that of EBay.
Product Auction Market
In the product auction market, users can exchange their virtual currency for physical prod-
ucts or services they value in real lives. Any user can post an item for sale and other users
can bid on the item using their earned points, similarly as how they buy and sell on eBay
with real money. The auction market provides a mechanism for users to acquire points
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when they run out of points, or cash points out for material rewards. When users buy and
sell products among themselves, the total amount of outstanding currency in circulation
does not change. If the seller is the "Planner", i.e. the government, currency is effectively
extracted out of circulation as transactions occur, and becomes available in the "Planner" 's
account for fiscal spending. The product auction market plays critical roles in the entire
framework of knowledge economy:
1. It enables a mechanism to externally back up the value of currency and assign material
value to virtual currency;
2. By performing linear regression between transaction prices denominated in Barter
currency and dollar value of listed auctioned goods, we are able to accurately calculate
the exchange rate between virtual and real currency at any given time;
3. It provides an important and effective mechanism to extract virtual currency out of
circulation when the "chief economist" implements contractionary monetary policies;
4. It provides the organization's management with an important tool to offer long-term
sustainable incentives to the users. The auction market isolates providing monetary
incentives from unnecessary details of knowledge creation; Consider the two incentive-
design examples in the previous chapter, the two firms can instead provide rewards
by spending resources through the auction market, and let the markets decide how
users value knowledge and virtual currency.
Fig.3-5 displays a screen-shot of the product auction market listing items being auctioned
on the market. As seen from the list of products on sale, users are creative in choosing
what products / services to sell. The auction market adds to the diversity and thickness of
markets, and enhance the fun and gamification aspects of the system. We will revisit this
topic when we discuss on monetary policies.
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Figure 3-5: Items posted on the product auction market.
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3.4.4 Market Engine for Standardized Securities
The Prediction Market and the Derivative Market for securitized information products are
powered by this engine. Modern exchanges and electronic markets where stocks, financial
securities, and commodities are traded all apply similar market engines. Compared with
the market engine for information products, it has the following characteristics:
* Products are highly standardized. Once product specification is defined, one unit is
entirely identical to another one, such as a share of equity;
e Minimum information asymmetry in terms of product quality or buyers' commitment
to pay, assuming users fully understand possible outcomes of purchasing the products
and potential risks;
* Buyers or sellers all seek or sell exactly identical products; their reputation signals do
not matter for product quality; only bid / ask prices matter;
* No spillover effects, the value of products depends on prices of latest transactions.
In a predictive market, the standardized security refers to an instrument whose return is
binary, say 0 or 100 points, which is determined by the unambiguous outcome of a future
event. Users might be willing to pay different prices to purchase such securities depending
on their assessment of the probability distribution of the future event.
In the derivative market for knowledge securities, the returns on the security come from the
income flows generated by the associated securitized knowledge object.
Again, we will not get into details of the market engine for standardized securities because
it has been widely studied and deployed in practice today. Prediction Markets has been
a popular topic for both academia and industry. We include it in the knowledge economy
framework because it provides value to a firm for predicting market trends, product success,
etc. All these markets are supported by the same currency, thus adding prediction markets
also improves market thickness and gamification aspects. We will discuss about derivative
market in the next chapter.
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3.5 Economic Modules
3.5.1 Attention & News Sharing
We have introduced the attention module above when covering the Q&A market. This
module plays critical roles in solving problem 2.b. Two problems co-exist in organizations:
" Social and knowledge management platforms create information A.D.D. - Attention
Deficit Disorder. They create too much noise clamoring for attention;
" Managers publish important announcements or news which frequently get neglected
by other members.
There are two cases when users need attention: 1) asking experts to pay attention to
their knowledge requests, and possibly provide responses; 2) asking ordinary users to pay
attention and read their knowledge objects for announcement or promotion. In both cases,
attention should not be acquired for free with 0 cost. Users can certainly subscribe to
other users, topics, or groups voluntarily, in which case they "pull" information into their
attention. The "Attention" module mainly addresses the "push" scenario.
In the case of asking for experts' attention when sending knowledge requests, an expert's
attention is priced according to his expertise level on relevant topics. The requester can
select how much to spend and which experts to pursue. The system will then notify the
experts that their attention is needed for knowledge requests. The experts can choose
to accept the attention-acquiring fee or return it after they land on the page and finish
reading the request. Whether they accept the fee and whether they provide knowledge will
be recorded, tracked, and displayed on users' profiles as signals.
In the case of promoting a knowledge object or making an announcement to attract more
users' eyeballs, the requester can set an offered price for attention, and specify how many
users to reach. An example of a news sharing module is provided below. Other users can
claim the attention points by performing simple actions, such as voting, after they visit the
page.
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News sharing module is a quasi marketplace that allows users to post articles, news, or
announcements to the Barter community and reap a profit if their postings become popular.
It is designed and built on top of the "Attention" module. Members of the Barter community
can vote on all submissions, and the popularity of a posting snowballs over time as top
trending posts work their way to the front page. When a user posts an article, news item,
or personal anecdote, she needs to allocate for the posting an initial value (Budget) and a
set number of points that are given to users who read her story (Points Per View, or PPV).
It is helpful to think of PPV as an advertising cost paid for each user: when people read
and vote on her story for the first time, the amount of points set as PPV is deducted from
the user's Budget. When the Budget runs out, the post expires. A posting's Budget will
increase if it would attract many users.
Does a user have incentives to make investment on acquiring more attention from others?
Barter captures spillover effects of information and rewards knowledge reuse. Knowledge
objects, news items included, generate long-term income flows based on their popularity and
reuse. A user can potentially earn more points back if his knowledge request, knowledge
object, or news item gets popularly reused. When a user makes a decision on attention
/advertising investment, he actually makes a bet on the quality and popularity of knowledge
he provides or elicits.
3.5.2 Market Fraud & Fraud Prevention
A companion of any type of market is market fraud, which jeopardizes market safety as
stated in the four general market design principles, and highlighted as Problem 4.f. Once
currency is backed with material value, users have incentives to outsmart market designers
and take unfair advantages to gain points that do not reflect their contribution of knowledge.
It is important to recognize that the line between "market fraud" and "exploiting market
loopholes" might appear blurry. "Market fraud" refers to user activities that violate real-
world laws, and user conducts that are explicitly forbidden in market rules and regulations
delivered to users upfront. Users might exploit market loopholes to earn points. Such
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activities are entirely legitimate as long as they are not explicitly forbidden, though they
might appear unfair and unwelcome. Market designers should bear the responsibility for
deficient mechanism design. When such exploitation occurs, managers can either move
them to the fraud category to prevent them from happening in future, or fix the loophole
by devising and deploying better mechanisms.
Possible types of market fraud include
Money Laundering Users conduct fraudulent transactions for ill purposes. For example,
one user asks a trivial question and transfers all bounty points to the other user who
provides a naive answer. The goal is to 1) boost the user's expertise status for relevant
fields (tags), or 2) convert currency types: turn unearned points into earned points;
Market Abuse Users contribute garbage knowledge just to collect government subsidies.
The "Planner" might reward users to encourage certain behaviors, such as voting,
tagging and leaving comments. In order to earn the subsidized points, users might
leave comments with trivialized contents, vote on knowledge object randomly. Strictly
speaking, market abuse is a result of users' exploitation of inferior market design,
which can be fixed by prudent mechanism design;
Copyright Infringement Upload copyrighted materials and make a profit on them;
Plagiarism Copy & paste others' original work without properly acknowledging or cred-
iting the authors, and make a profit on the stolen work;
All these types of market fraud have been proven evident in our research deployment, where
we did not deploy a governing and regulatory mechanism. To clean fraudulent behaviors
from the markets and protect market safety and integrity, we have designed the fraud
detection and prevention mechanism. Detection of market fraud is sourced to the crowd.
Users collectively identify and report suspicious behaviors. When a user detects a potential
fraud or inappropriate contents, she can red-flag it. When the number of red flags reaches a
threshold, the case will be moved to the "resolution space" for users' opinions and possible
conviction. In the "resolution space", users vote on the case based on whether they believe
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the case actually involves market fraud. The judging process follows a state-transition
diagram based on time and users' votes. When the case is closed, a verdict is made about
whether it constitutes a fraud or it is innocent. Users who vote on the right side will be
rewarded. The offender gets penalized so that she experiences both economic losses and
social damages on reputation. Speaking in Information Economics terms, fraud prevention
module is another example of accurate signaling and screening.
Encouraging users to report suspicious behaviors and participate in the fraud voting process
also requires appropriate incentives, and involves behavioral modification. We will revisit
issues around market fraud in later chapters.
3.5.3 Credit Tracking & Attribution
This module aims at tackling some ailing pain points that particularly harasses the docu-
ment market. In many knowledge-based organizations, such as consulting and law firms,
effective document sharing and reuse is critical to the organization's competitiveness and
overall success. Contents used in one document can be referenced, reused, or even repre-
sented in other documents which deal with similar cases.
However, one discouraging factor that impedes effective document sharing is that there
has not been an effective approach for tracking credits and getting original contributors
recognized and rewarded fairly. For instance, an author of a Powerpoint presentation shares
her deck of slides with her colleagues. The slides might include valuable figures, tables, or
graphs that later appear in several other documents. The original author might not receive
enough credits or rewards for her original work, which damages her incentives to share more
in future.
The ultimate goal of our proposed solution is to establish a connected graph of knowledge
objects, where each node represents a knowledge object, and each link represents "credit
attribution". There is a coefficient associated with each link. For example, for the link
from A to B, the coefficient tells the percentage of document A's contents that derive from
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Figure 3-6: Demonstration of credit tracking and attribution 1 - documents are organized
as a connected graph
document B. When document A generates revenue, document B should receive a portion
of the revenue based on the coefficient.
This module presents an innovative way of detecting and managing plagiarism, and trans-
forms credit sharing from a pain into a powerful feature. The specific algorithms and
mechanism design that implement credit tracking is beyond the scope of this dissertation
research. Here, we simply recognize the power of such a module under the knowledge econ-
omy framework. Fig.3-6 and Fig.3-7 demonstrate the concepts. The graph was generated
based an algorithm that tracks textual overlapping portions among all documents stored in
Barter's document market. The algorithm and implementation is developed and presented
in work [25].
3.5.4 Reuse Tracking
The meaning and value of the Reuse Tracking module has been briefly covered when we dis-
cuss about challenges for building a market for information products and when we introduce
the Q&A market. Reuse tracking refers to the algorithm for measuring and capturing the
long-term value generated by the spillover effects of knowledge objects. A knowledge object,
after being elicited and shared freely on the platform, creates value for users when it is re-
visited and reused. The reuse value is not manifested through regular market interactions,
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Figure 3-7: Demonstration of credit tracking & attribution 2 - revenues generated by a
document are redistributed based upon reuse coefficients
but needs to be captured and rewarded centrally by the "government".
Tracking the reuse value of knowledge objects and rewarding their creators fairly is a subject
within "fiscal policies". Thus, we cover reuse tracking algorithm and mechanisms in detail
in the next chapter.
3.6 Peripheral Modules
Peripheral modules refer to Barter's system features, user interactions, or visualizations that
are not part of Barter's core engine layer, but belong to the "presentation layer". They
significantly impact the usability and attractiveness of a knowledge platform.
3.6.1 Social Network
Social features are instrumental in getting users attracted and engaged. On Barter, a user
manages her profile and controls what information is accessible to other users. Users can
establish friendship and form communities among themselves if they share similar interests
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Figure 3-8: Social Navigation View
or job functions. Users can follow or subscribe other users and groups to have corresponding
knowledge objects more readily accessible in their news feeds.
The formed social graph constantly updates itself with new market activities. For instance,
a user can make her question or document private by sharing it only with her friends
network or within a particular group. Conversely, the system has the capability to tell a
user who she interacts with most in the market so that a friendship link can be potentially
established, users who share similar interests and interact more can form a group.
Fig.3-8 displays an interactive tool on Barter for social navigation with a user-centric view.
Attributes of the visualization are interpreted as follows: (a) Radius: frequency of interac-
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Figure 3-9: Expertise Tag Cloud and Experts Matching.
tions in the market; (b) Thickness of links: amount of points exchanged; (c) Color of links:
inflow (Green) vs. outflow (Red) of points; (d) Pop-up list: historical interactions in the
market; (e) Buttons shown when a user's icon is clicked: ask the user a question or go to
the target user's self-centric view.
When Barter is deployed as an internal knowledge markets tool for an organization, orga-
nizational hierarchy is implied in the social graph in addition to user-formed connections.
No user on such a socially bounded platform can act as an absolute stranger. Thus, we can
expect that users exhibit socially responsible behaviors, which in turn reduces the risk of
users gaming the system and sabotaging market fairness.
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3.6.2 Experts Matching
Barter keeps accumulating and mining historic data about a user's activities in the market,
including questions she asks or answers, documents she shares and downloads, ideas she
contributes or solicits, etc. "True" expertise tags are synthesized and displayed on the user's
profile. Barter is able to accurately measure the value a user has created on a particular
area (tag).
Fig.3-9 shows an interactive tool on Barter named "Expertise Cloud". On the left panel is a
tag cloud that consists of the most popular tags in the system. Tags are positioned following
a modified force-directed algorithm. The sizes of the tags encode the sizes of "Knowledge
GDP" created on respective tags, i.e. the amount of transactions on knowledge objects
that are associated with the tags. Links between tags represent concurrence in knowledge
objects. Linked tags get highlighted when a tag is hovered or clicked. The top-right panel
displays a list of experts for the clicked tag, sorted by expertise scores on that tag, and the
bottom-right panel displays a list of most popular knowledge objects in the market tagged
by the clicked keyword. This is a visualization tool on Barter for exploring popular topics
inside the organization and matching top experts and top knowledge contents to query
terms.
Here, Information Economics helps solve the disclosure problem in information asymmetry.
Barter helps knowledge suppliers "signal" their expertise via their earned expertise points.
So they do know what they claim to know. Barter helps knowledge seekers "screen" for
good content by helping filter on the highest rated content and the highest earning experts.
3.7 Comparison between a real-world economy and the Barter
knowledge economy
We find it helpful to compare Barter side-by-side with the U.S. economy to understand how
different components of the platform operate, as shown in Table 3.2. It is worth emphasizing
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that fine-grained currency controls enable certain advanced functions that are infeasible in
a real-world economy, as explained in detail in subsequent sections.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we present a complete system architecture of the Barter knowledge economy,
which consists of three key components: knowledge currency, knowledge market mechanism,
and economic policies. We focus on introducing the market engine for information products.
We demonstrate how economic theories and practice such as information economics and
quantity theories of money are applied in the design framework. We also explain why
certain design choices effectively solve problems listed in Chapter 2.
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Table 3.2: Comparison between U.S. economy and the Barter information economy
U.S. Economy Barter Knowledge Economy
Currency - U.S. $ Barter implements its own virtual currency system. It is
universally accepted and circulated inside Barter. Users can
exchange knowledge currency for either knowledge or ma-
terial rewards. Advanced features include expiration at an
optimal schedule.
Markets for prod- Barter implements multiple types of markets to meet various
ucts & services organizational needs. Markets include 1) Q&A, 2) document
exchange, 3) ideas, 4) prediction, 5) services, 6) news, 7)
product auction, 8) design for self-design, etc. These are
referred to as "primary information markets".
Federal Reserve Barter establishes an entity, dubbed the "Central Bank" to
Bank & monetary track issuance and callback of currency. Dashboards help
policies the "chief economist" monitor and understand the status
of the economy. A set of economic tools are provided tune
parameters of the economy to improve its operation and
running.
Organizations Users on Barter can form groups, and perform intra-group or
versus Individuals inter-group market activities. More advanced group struc-
tures include "guilds", where users earn membership and
"cliques" where membership is by permission.
Regulatory bodies Barter uses self-governing and self-regulating crowds that
are rewarded for community activities such as policing mem-
bers and cleaning content.
Securitization On Barter, information products can be securitized and
and secondary traded on a secondary market. Securitization applies to
markets (Eq- multiple markets, such as the Q&A market, document ex-
uity, Commodity, change, and ideas. Trading increases market thickness, helps
Bond markets, sort and organize information by its value, and improves in-
and Derivative formation timeliness and quality by emphasizing ownership.
markets) Securitization gives people a share of the future value their
knowledge creates, which alleviate the free-rider problem for
idea generation.
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Chapter 4
Mechanism Design
4.1 Overview
This chapter introduces advanced architectural design on three important components:
Monetary Policies conducted by the "Central Bank" to manage currency supply;
Fiscal Policies conducted by the "Planner", a term that represents the "Government" of
the knowledge economy; Fiscal policies are employed to reward knowledge reuse and
encourage good behaviors;
Information Securitization & Derivative Markets an innovative framework where knowl-
edge products are securitized that generate long-term point inflows, and the ownership
of knowledge objects are divided up into shares which all users can buy and sell.
Monetary and fiscal policies provide management of an organization who administers a
knowledge platform advanced managerial tools. With these economic tools, management is
able to supervise the platform on a macro-level, rather than micro-manage what knowledge
objects ought to be created and how they are priced. How resources are allocated and
valuation of knowledge should be determined by all market participants.
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We have briefly introduced these modules in the previous chapter as part of the system
architecture. Because of the complexity and significance of these modules, this chapter is
dedicated to covering their mechanism design in detail.
4.2 Economy, Central Bank, The Planner, Monetary & Fis-
cal Policies
4.2.1 Overview
The knowledge economy consists of knowledge currency, knowledge markets, and economic
policies that are designed for the prosperity and health of the economy. In the knowledge
economy, there are two special entities: the "Central Bank", and the "Planner".
The primary role of the "Central Bank" is to issue, monitor and manage currency in the
whole economy. Its role is similar to that of the Federal Reserve Bank to the U.S. economy.
Monetary policies are tools employed by the "Central Bank" to stimulate or "cool down"
economic activities. Currencies are injected into the economy or extracted out of circulation
when the "Central Bank" employs expansionary or contractionary policies.
The corresponding counterpart of the "Planner" in a real-world economy is the government.
We might use the two terms interchangeably. In a real-world market-based economy, the
government does not directly participate in market activities or forcefully direct resources.
However, the government is able to generate revenues for central spending through taxa-
tion, running state-owned enterprises, issuing debts, or simply printing money. In many
western economies, issuing new currency is locked up with the "Central Bank" purchas-
ing government-issued debt securities. Government spending and revenue generation have
important implications for prosperity of an economy. The most relevant purposes in the con-
text of knowledge markets are: 1) investing in products and services that are under-created
in a decentralized economy such as infrastructure, security, and fundamental research, and
2) setting directions and encouraging certain behaviors, such as offering tax credits for green
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energy or home ownership. In the knowledge economy, the "Planner" conducts government
spending by employing fiscal policies.
4.2.2 Real-world vs. Knowledge Economy
Innovations tend to find inspiration or mirror analogs in natural precedents. We thus seek
proven theories and practice from the real-world economy when we design and build the
knowledge economy.Goals pursued by a real-world economy are multi-faceted with many
historical, societal and economic concerns. The structure of a real-world economy is rather
complex with various institutions and laws. In contrast, for a knowledge economy, the
goal is straightforward: maximize knowledge creation and sharing, and get contributors
fairly rewarded and recognized. Therefore, when we learn from real-world experiences and
replicate the successful mechanisms in the knowledge economy, we have to manage the
complexity and make necessary simplifications to make them most effective.
In a real-world economy, the roles of the "Central Bank" and the government are clearly
separated. Using the U.S. economy as an example, the Federal Reserve exerts monetary
policies independent from government policies. The Fed stimulates or cools down the econ-
omy by tightening or loosening credits injected in the economy. The Fed controls credits
by setting target interest rate, which is affected by open market operations - buying and
selling government-issued debt securities. The government does not issue new currency -
the currency supply is increased when the Fed purchases government deb securities.
In a virtual knowledge economy, such a delicate and rather complex structure may not be
justified necessary for knowledge management purposes. In practice, when deploying such a
knowledge economy inside an organization, it adds perplexity to users trying to differentiate
the "Central Bank", the "Planner", or the management of the organization from users'
perspectives. Both the "Central Bank" and the "Planner" are often perceived as the same
invisible policy maker. They can be confused with managers of a firm who administer such
an internal knowledge economy. Monetary and fiscal policies will eventually be designed and
executed by humans. Therefore, such a layer of separation can be isolated from knowledge
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markets participants. Conceptually separating the two entities does help us understand
their roles and functions more clearly in the design framework.
In this dissertation research, we make the following important simplifications in our discus-
sion:
" Interests rates and credits are not considered. In a real-world economy, borrow-
ing from individuals and the government, lending initiated in the fractional banking
system, drive the concepts of interests rates and credits, and form the basis of many
economic activities; However, to simplify our discussion, we do not consider interest
rates and credits;
" The "Central Bank" and the "Planner" own the same bank account and
initiate policies together. In the U.S. economy, the clear separation between the
Federal Reserve and the government relies on the existence of credits and debt is-
suance. Given that we do not include them in our discussion, we can combine their
accounts into one account set up at the "Central Bank", and consider them as a sin-
gle policy maker. Both terms "Central Bank" and "Planner" are conceptually virtual
entities which initiate monetary and fiscal policies.
The simplification above is helpful not only in facilitating our discussions on economic
policies, but also in software architecture design and system deployment. It also implies that
the "Central Bank" can directly create currency and save it in its account. The "Planner"
injects currency into the knowledge economy through fiscal spending. This process does
not involve complex exchanges such as debt issuance and open market operations.
4.2.3 Currency Circulation
After introducing the overall framework and making the simplifications, we clearly define
how the "Central Bank" and the "Planner" interact with the knowledge economy:
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Figure 4-1: Monetary policies that impact the currency exchange between the central bank
and the knowledge economy
The "Central Bank" monitors key economic indicators such as levels of economic activ-
ities, price indexes, and sets up a target growth rate of currency supply. This gap on
new currency issuance also determines budgetary constraints for the "Planner";
The "Planner" generates revenue and meanwhile extracts currency out circulation, and
injects currency into the knowledge by fiscal spending.
The two entities own the same bank account at the "Central Bank". The currency circu-
lation between this account and the knowledge economy is shown in Fig.4-1 and explained
in detail below.
At a given time t,
N - The total number of users in the economy;
85
P'Kz Pn- Po -w I -ee dd ge ee
L Economy
m - Average wealth - the average of currency owned by each user on average;
gc - Target currency growth - the expected issuance of new currency from time t to t + 1
is thus N m gc.
There are multiple ways in which more currencies get injected into the economy from time
t to t + 1, which are modeled as follows
AN - The number of new users who join the economy during the unit time period; the
average number of users during this time period for policy consideration is denoted
using N;
in- New user reward rate - currency issued per newly registered user;
i- Stimulation budget rate. The "Central Bank" deposits "fast" expiring points to users'
accounts to encourage spending and simulate activities. These "fast" expiring points
are converted into regular "slow" expiring points when spent for knowledge before
expiration time; i, denotes currency issued to each user for stimulation at time t;
if, - Budgetary rate for fiscal spending on rewarding knowledge reuse; the "Planner"
rewards knowledge reuse to capture the spill-over effects of information products; The
total budget is thus N - if,;
if b - Budgetary rate for fiscal spending on rewarding good behaviors; the "Planner" re-
wards good behaviors such as voting, tagging, and fraud reporting; the total budget
is N - if b, which can be further divided into multiple pools rewarding different types
of behaviors.
There are also multiple ways in which currencies get taken out of circulation from the
economy, which are modeled as follows
os - Rate at which the subsidized "fast" expiring points expire and get returned to the
central bank. os =s -rce, in which rce represents the expiration ratio;
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o - Rate at which users get penalized or charged for discouraged behaviors such as
market fraud or content deletion; Charging penalty fees is considered as part of fiscal
policies that can be controlled by the "Planner";
oft - Rate at which the "Planner" taxes users for supporting fiscal spending; taxation is
considered as part of fiscal policies for revenue generation;
U,- The amount of currency spent on the product auction market to purchase items
sponsored by the organization. U, = U -rex, where U is the $ budget the organization
invests in the product auction market, and re, is the exchange rate between the virtual
currency and real-world currency.
Some of these rates and attributes are observable at a steady-state of the knowledge econ-
omy, and some of these rates can be controlled and tuned as part of the fiscal and monetary
policies.
4.2.4 Monetary Policies
Definition of "money supply": total amount of currency issuance that are outstanding for
usage in the knowledge economy. Currency that resides in the central bank account does
not count towards the amount of money supply. Monetary policies represent the practice
of stimulating or cooling down the knowledge economy by adjusting the money supply.
Money supply must be at the right level - if currency is over-supplied, inflation will be
introduced, price indexes go up, and as a result users care less about currency since its value
has been diluted; if currency is under-supplied, the economy becomes stagnated because
users do not have enough currency to perform economic activities. This leads to a situation
when knowledge and innovation is under-created.
Using the modeling variables introduced above, we can establish the following relationship
among currency issuance, revenue generation and fiscal spending:
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N-m-gc+Uv+N7-os+N .-op+N oft = AN-in+N-is+N/-ifr+N-ifb (4.1)
Reshuffling terms of the equation, and grouping terms with similar functionalities, we obtain
a more succinct form of the equation:
N m -g =ANin - U-re +N is(1 - rce)+N (ifr+ifb) -N (ofp+oft) (4.2)
Each group of terms is interpreted and denoted as follows
N -m - gc =AN - in- U -rex + N - is(1 - rce) +N - (ifr + ifb) - N - (ofp + of t)
New Currency Issuance New Users $ Spending Stimulation Policy Fiscal Spending Generated Revenue
(4.3)
Evident from Eq.4.3, the total amount of currency supply outstanding in the knowledge
economy changes when the "Planner" executes fiscal policies, and when the organization
management extracts currency out of circulation by selling material goods in the auction
market. We have modeled how currencies get circulated between the central bank account
and the economy. We can broadly categorize them into
Spending policies or practice that require allocated budget, the effect of which is to take
currencies out of the central bank account and push them into the economy:
Stimulation Policy (SP) - Users receive "free points" periodically for knowledge spend-
ing, which expire faster than regular points;
New Users (NU) - When new users join the knowledge economy, they need starting
funds in their accounts; given that new users can always receive points through stim-
ulation policy and the "Planner"'s subsidies for rewarding good behaviors, users can
start their activities without initial funds; the spending on new users is expected to
be near zero;
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Fiscal Spending (FS) - The "Planner"'s spending for rewarding knowledge reuse, con-
ducting behavioral modifications, or running campaigns;
Policies or practice that generate revenue, the effect of which is to extract currencies out of
the economy, and save them back in the central bank account:
$ Spending (RS) - Organizational management sells material goods on the production
auction market to users;
Revenue Generation (RG) - Taxation, penalty and fees charged on users, aggregated
as revenue to support different types of spending.
On one side, the "Planner" conducts spending for various purposes; on the other side, the
"Planner" receives revenues to support such spending. The gap between the two, i.e. the
"deficit", is fulfilled by newly issued currency (NIC), or plainly speaking, the "printed
money". In Eq.4.3, the NIC terms appears on the left-hand side of the equation. However,
this does not imply that NIC is determined by the other spending and revenue variables
at the end of each budgetary cycle aftermath. Conversely, how much new currency can be
created and issued, i.e. the target growth rate of currency, is totally independent from the
other variables. The target growth rate is determined at the beginning of each budgetary
cycle entirely based on the prosperity and fairness of the knowledge economy. Such a
target growth rate determines the maximum amount of allowable "printed money", which
in turn sets budgetary constraints for spending and revenue generation. In conclusion,
target currency growth rate is an independent variable solely determined by the "Central
Bank" based on observing several economic indicators, rather than a dependent variable
that results from the "Planner" the policies.
From a budgetary planning perspective, Eq.4.3 can be rewritten as
SP + NU + FS = RS + RG + NIC. (4.4)
We next interpret this relationship and explain how it impacts monetary and fiscal policies,
and then draw a few important insights from this relationship.
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Determining Target Currency Growth
Determining the target currency growth rate is the essential element of setting monetary
policies, which in turn sets budgetary constraints for fiscal policies. One of the major
contributions and innovations presented in this research is the introduction of the "Central
Bank" entity, and monetary tools that stimulate or moderate knowledge activities through
currency management.
In a real-world economy, such as the U.S. economy, monetary policies determine the avail-
ability of credits in the economy. When credits are under-provided, individuals and busi-
nesses do not have enough resources to conduct economic activities and make new invest-
ment, economy is stagnated; when credits are over-provided, the economy gets overheated,
price indexes go up and inflation occurs, which will lead to social and economic problems.
Determining the optimal level of credit supply is not a straightforward process. It is a
practical art that depends on macroeconomic theories and past experiences rather than
rigorous science. In the U.S. economy, the Federal Reserve exerts monetary policies through
1) short-term interest rate, 2) discount rate, and 3) required reserve ratio. The overall goals
include maintaining the stability of the financial system, reducing unemployment rate, and
achieving long-term prosperity of the U.S. economy. Historically, the money supply keeps
increasing at a steady pace, and it is well accepted that a moderate inflation rate and
increase in currency supply is beneficiary to the vigor of the economy. The Federal Reserve
keeps monitoring key economic indicators published by federal bureaus, and make monetary
policies based on these statistics.
Barter mirrors established and successful practice and theories from the real world and
adopts similar mechanisms for the knowledge economy. Because we do not consider interest
rates and lending activities, the concepts of "credits" are not relevant. Instead, the "Central
Bank" directly manages the currency supply.
The following economic indicators should be calculated and closely monitored for the "Cen-
tral Bank" to determine appropriate currency growth rate:
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"CPI" - Price indexes of knowledge products, the percentage of increase in which repre-
sents the inflation level of the knowledge economy. In a real-world economy, due to
the wide diversity and quantity of goods and services, the statistics bureau can only
select representative products and services from various industries to form the "bas-
ket", and assign different weights to them when calculating the price index. Within a
knowledge economy, there are usually less varieties and quantities of knowledge prod-
ucts and associated transactions, which are all stored in the database. This makes
tracking price indexes convenient and accurate. A high inflation level indicates a
risk of currency oversupply, and a low inflation level indicates there is still room for
increasing currency supply;
Requesters Price Index - How many points on average users post as bounty when
they request knowledge objects;
Sellers' Ask Price Index - How many points on average users ask as price when
they post knowledge objects with price tags;
Buyers' Transaction Price Index - How many points on average a knowledge
requester pays a knowledge provider who responds to the request and share
knowledge for free;
Sellers' Transaction Price Index - How many points on average a user pays a
knowledge seller who sell knowledge objects with price tags;
Transaction Price Index - The average points transfered across all knowledge
transactions between two users;
Each of them represents a different type of price index designed for a different purpose.
However, we expect all these indexes having similar trends and movements.
"Exchange Rate" - The rex term used in Eq.4.3, which can be measured by the $
amount of products posted in the auction market, and how much users spend to
acquire them using virtual currency. If re increases, one $ can exchange more virtual
currency, which implies that virtual currency depreciates. Users devaluing currency
is a warning sign that the economy is experiencing inflation.
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"GDP" - The amount of knowledge creation and the total value brought to the commu-
nity by the created knowledge. GDP can be denominated in either virtual currency
or real $ by use of the exchange rate. When GDP is calculated, it consists of two
components:
"Consumption" - The sum of all peer-to-peer knowledge transactions among users,
excluding the ones in the product auction market; This component represents
the value of knowledge that is directly perceived and paid for by users;
"Investment" - The sum of all "Planner-to-users" transactions rewarding knowl-
edge reuse and good behaviors as part of the fiscal spending. This component
captures the reuse value brought by freely shared knowledge, and value created
by extended knowledge objects such as tagging and voting;
We must be careful that double-counting must be avoided. Transactions that occur
in the product auction market do not count towards the knowledge GDP. It is still
valuable to track this portion since it shows user activeness and another type of value
created by the platform;
The following indicators are also critical to the health and prosperity of the knowledge
economy. They can be affected or improved by monetary policies, however, they cannot
be fully addressed by monetary policies alone. Associated problems require both effective
monetary and fiscal policies to solve.
"Wealth Imbalance" - Inequity of income and wealth among different users. Skewness
and Kurtosis of wealth distribution are important indicators;
"Inactive Users" - The number of users who rarely or never participate in any activities
in this knowledge economy; this group of users have not receive enough incentives
to participate, contribute, and share knowledge; we can track users' activeness by
counting the number of user actions performed during the past period such as log-ins,
votes, comments, answers, etc.;
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Figure 4-2: Prototype of Economic Dashboard
"Fairness" - Sufficient fairness is a critical condition for a successful economy. This is
not an index that can be measured quantitatively, but qualitatively through users'
online or offline feedbacks.
Real $ Resources in Virtual Economy
An organization can use the Product Auction Market to back up the value of currency and
provide material incentives to users. The framework of a knowledge economy allows an
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organization to systematically inject $ resources into the platform, and provide long-term
sustainable material incentives. Eq.4.1 and Eq.4.4 connect $ resources an organization plans
to invest with the virtual knowledge economy. Let's revisit and simplify Eq.4.4 and examine
the roles of $ spending:
Central Spending = "Generated Revenue" + "Printed Currency" + "Currency Buyback"
(4.5)
At the beginning of each budgetary cycle, the "Planner" designs and allocates budgets for
different spending policies: fiscal policies, stimulation policies, etc. The budget pool comes
from three major sources: 1) currencies "printed" by the central bank via monetary policies;
2) revenue generation through taxes and fees; and 3) currencies that are bought back by
the organization through selling $ resources in the auction market.
As we introduced earlier, when the organization's management sells material items on the
product auction market, the value of currency is backed up with material incentives, and
an exchange rate can extrapolated. Eq.4.5 offers a new angle of viewing this practice. The
organization's management effectively purchases virtual currencies from the hands of all
users, extract them out of circulation in the economy, save them back in the central bank
account, so that they can be spent back into the economy to support different goals.
As introduced in the previous section, how much new currency can be printed out to support
fiscal spending is determined independently, and considered fixed. If the budget for central
spending is fixed, the "Planner" needs to balance between taxing / penalizing users to
generate revenue or relying on $ spending to buy back currency. If the organization has a
large amount of $ resources to support the knowledge economy, the "Planner" does not need
to impose much taxation. On the other end, if the organization only has a small budget
on using $ resources to put through the auction market, the "Planner" needs to rely more
on taxation and fee generation, or simply reduces central spending, which might hurt the
economy.
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It is worth emphasizing that when organization management determines how much $ re-
sources to invest in the knowledge economy, they should be aware that the exchange rate
between virtual currency and real currency does not stay constant, but will be directly
impacted by the availability of material goods on the market. In general, rex is a decreasing
function of U.
4.2.5 Fiscal Policies
In a real-world economy, an efficient market mechanism allows all market participants to
optimally allocate resources and create goods and services among themselves in a decen-
tralized manner; an effective "Central Bank" designs monetary policies that maintain the
stability of the financial system and optimize currency supply. The government utilizes fiscal
policies to stimulate the economy, invest on basic infrastructure, set directions on economic
activities that should be encouraged, which are often infeasible for the crowd to accom-
plish in a decentralized manner. Examples include government investment on fundamental
science research, public services, basic infrastructure, tax credits on green energy or home-
ownership. As a result, the government needs to generate revenue by taxing individuals
who enjoy public goods, and spend the revenue back on the community.
In the context of a knowledge economy, there are also similar challenges that can only be
solved by similar fiscal policies set by the "Planner" in a centralized manner. There are
mainly three categories that exhibit properties of public goods and basic infrastructure:
Rewarding Knowledge Reuse - Capturing, measuring, and rewarding reuse of knowl-
edge objects;
Behavioral Modifications - Rewarding good behaviors inside the knowledge economy
such as voting, tagging, fraud reporting, etc., which are essential to the success of a
knowledge economy for various reasons;
Running Campaign - Depending on the status or problems of the knowledge economy,
the "Planner" can run campaigns to promote certain behaviors or activities during a
limited time period.
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As shown in Eq.4.5, budgets for fiscal policies are supported by 1) allowable newly printed
currencies, 2) revenue generation from the economy through taxation and fees, and 3)
currencies bought back through spending $ resources. The size of budgets is dependent
upon the availability of each, and what is best for the economy. It is not the other way
around that how much we spend on fiscal policies determine how much money we should
print. After obtaining the overall budget, the "Planner" divides it into several pools to
support different categories of fiscal policies. We will discuss each category of fiscal policies
in subsequent sections.
4.2.6 Market Seeding
Original spending can help solicit knowledge and get the platform adopted. The chick-and-
egg problem of a new two-sided network platform can be effectively solved using market
seeding. In the early stage of opening the platform, organizational management can seed
the market by requesting information via these markets and pushing more rewards to the
auction market. It is explicitly the seed and subsidize strategy of two-sided networks, which
helps address the motivation problem listed as part of our research strategy.
4.3 Reward Reuse & Long-term Fair Distribution
4.3.1 Encouraging Spending
An excessive saving rate - the problem of currency hoarding can lead an economy prone
to failure. Real-world examples include China's economy which is driven by government
investment and export. Domestic spending / consumption is very low compared with U.S.
economy which implies long-term structural problems. From the quantity theory of money,
we have learned that a low turn-over rate of currency leads to a low production level, and
the overall economy turns stagnant where economic activities are inactive.
To reiterate, we have designed two important mechanisms that aim to encourage user spend-
ing:
96
Currency expiration Currency expires if not spent before certain deadlines; users are
thus encouraged to spend the points for knowledge or other products before expiration
of points;
Spending as investment As introduced above, when a user spends currency to elicit
knowledge / contents from other users, the user can potentially earn points back if
the request brings good discussion on the topic and the elicited contents get reused
in future. This "ballooning" distribution mechanism provides incentives for users to
ask good questions or request important information by spending. This is why the
initial spending for requesting knowledge is similar to an investment - spend today
and expect returns in future.
4.3.2 Reuse Tracking
Knowledge objects (KO) can be organized using a tree structure based on their elicitation /
response relationships, as depicted in Fig.4-3. Note that this tree structure is fundamentally
different from the tree structure in credit tracking and assignment module for documents,
where each link represents the ratio of overlapping contents between parent and child doc-
uments. In the context of reuse tracking, each link of the tree represents how the child
knowledge object is elicited and attached.
In Fig.4-3, we use a Q&A thread as an example. The question is the root of the tree,
its answers and direct comments or amendments are the first-generation children, whose
comments and their threaded comments form further descendants. At any particular time,
there are multiple trees in the knowledge base. We can trace the tree back to the root from
any knowledge object node.
At the beginning of each budgetary period, the "Planner" allocates FSR as total budgets
for rewarding knowledge reuse. At the end of this budgetary period, we have K knowledge
objects in the system. We can calculate a "reuse score" for knowledge object k based on its
observable attributes. Here we consider four attributes:
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Figure 4-3: Knowledge objects are organized as a tree structure
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Voting - Number of unique votes received during the past budgetary period, denoted
using n,,k;
Unique Page visits - Number of unique page visits during the past budgetary period,
denoted using ny,k;
Tipping received - Amount of tipping received during the past budgetary period, de-
noted using nt,k;
Derivative contents - Number of derivative knowledge objects, i.e., the number of all
descendants from this node generated during the past budgetary period, denoted using
nd,k; This number should be counted excluding the knowledge objects created by the
same author.
These attributes are all proxies to the quality and reuse value a knowledge object, and they
carry different weights. For example, the amount of tipping received is a much stronger
signal compared with page visits in indicating the reuse value. A reuse score Rk is a function
of these observable attributes:
Rk = f (nv,k, np,k, nt,k, nd,k). (4.6)
The simplest form of the reuse function is a linear function with different weights assigned
to different observable attributes:
Rk = wv - nv,k + wp np,k + Wt - nt,k + Wd - nd,k, (4.7)
where we, wp, Wt, Wd are weights to be estimated in order to optimize knowledge creation
and achieve sufficient fairness. Suppose the total budget of fiscal spending on rewarding
reuse is FSR following the notation in Eq.4.4, each knowledge object can receive a reuse
reward
Rk -Wk
Mre,k = FSR - - Wk, (4.8)
k=1 Rk - Wk'
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Figure 4-4: Redistribution along the tree structure
where W is a window filter function for adjustment. For example, we might not want
the bottom knowledge objects to receive reuse rewards, or we want the top performers to
receive more rewards. We could use Wk function to do re-balancing.
A redistribution mechanism based on back-tracing is designed and explained in Fig.4-4. The
knowledge object k does not keep M,, in its entirety. There is a back-tracing redistribution
rate rbt, (0 < rbt < 1), so that part of the rewards Mre,k go back to its ancestors along the
tree, in an exponentially decreasing order.
Such a redistribution mechanism explains why requests for knowledge objects can also gen-
erate incomes, and why good questions or remarks that stimulate great further discussions
can receive long-term fair rewards. The reuse tracking and redistribution mechanism creates
incentives for spending, advertising, or even leaving comments on other knowledge objects,
because of the long-term fair return.
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4.4 Rewarding Good Behavior
The success and usefulness of an organizational information market platform critically de-
pend on seemingly simple actions by users, such as voting, tagging, tipping, and fraud
reporting. In essence, a popular mechanism adopted by many platforms is to outsource
knowledge indexing, knowledge validation, knowledge valuation, and maintaining platform
integrity to the crowd. The platform works well if users actively engage in these simple
activities, and as a result the content provides greater value to the community. These ac-
tivities are broadly categorized into "Good Behavior" in the following discussion. We visit
the list of activities we want to promote in more detail.
4.4.1 Voting (Thumbing)
All users collectively determine the value, quality, and usefulness of a piece of information
by providing a binary opinion. With sufficient participation, voting results provide an
accurate signal indicating information value to the community. As a result, more valuable
information gets promoted to knowledge seekers, and the searching cost is reduced. The
measure of information value and re-usage tracking also depend on the voting results.
From a practical perspective, although today's user interfaces make voting as simple as
a mouse click, many users still lack the motivation and interests to perform the simple
action. Following the classic 20-80 model, the majority of users are still free-riders who
only take away knowledge other users contribute to the platform and enjoy the benefits of
other users' voting actions without contributing back. We wish to establish an ecosystem
inside a community with a collaborative culture where every individual's success on learning
and knowledge acquisition depends on each other's actions, even as simple as clicking on a
voting button.
In the context of a knowledge market with economic tools, how can we provide incentives
for users to vote on contents following their true assessment of information value? A poorly
designed incentive structure can easily encourage irresponsible behaviors of excessive voting.
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For instance, putting a fixed price tag on each vote, 1 point per vote, e.g., will tend to collect
a lot of garbage voting - users vote on information contents without really assessing its true
value to them in order only to collect the point rewards.
The original purpose of encouraging voting is to better assess the value of information and
sort contents for easier re-usage to users. Therefore, a vote should be rewarded only if such
a vote achieves this purpose. The "central bank" should only award votes that help the
platform recognize information value and sort contents by their value. An algorithm needs
to be developed to measure the value of a vote, and the "central bank" subsidizes voting
based on whether votes add significant value to the platform.
4.4.2 Tipping
Tipping not only serves as a signal for appreciation and gratitude between two individuals, it
is also an important activity for the platform to value and sort information contents. Tipping
is similar to voting for the purpose of information valuation and sorting. Both tipped
amounts and received votes are strong signals as proxies to the re-usage value and quality
of a piece of information. Tipped amount is an important attribute used for calculating a
re-usage score, similar to voting results.
The "central bank" can subsidize tipping to encourage such behaviors. The challenge is to
avoid fix-pricing subsidy and promote tipping as a social norm. Promote tipping as a social
norm also alleviates the problem of points getting overly mercenary.
4.4.3 Tagging
For any knowledge platform such as a Q&A exchange, document management, or idea
management tools, tagging is always an important feature. Information items usually con-
tain complex textual contents which present significant challenges to knowledge indexing,
categorizing, and searching, in terms of both accuracy and speed performance. Therefore,
accurate and sufficient tagging of each information item is critical to the success of a large
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scalable knowledge market. Re-usage of information will be jeopardized if indexing and
searching under-perform, and the value of the platform is not fully explored.
The original information contributor - either as an information seeker or an information
provider - can supply tags. However, such a simple but extra activity also suffers from
incentive problems. Often the original information contributors do not provide sufficient
and accurate tags after they finish the main body of contents. A popular mechanism is to
crow-source tagging to all users and let everyone add or remove tags. However, such crowd-
sourcing mechanism for tagging also experiences participation and incentive problems.
In the context of an information market, the good behavior of tagging can be encouraged
and subsidized by the "central bank". The subsidizing mechanism is challenging in that a
naive fixed-pricing mechanism can introduce excessive garbage tags into the system. For
instance, in a scheme where users receive 1 point for each tag provided, users tend to provide
low-quality tags just to get the subsidy points.
We develop an algorithm and design a mechanism where only tags that meet certain criteria
get rewarded. The criteria has two components
Accuracy A keyword accurately represents and summarizes the content;
Sufficiency Any information item can usually be sufficiently represented by a limited num-
ber of tags. Some tags still represent relevance, but only cover some minor details of
the information item. We want to reward tags based on their relative importance and
expressive power. For insignificant tags, we want to devise rules to reduce or avoid
rewarding.
The challenge of measuring accuracy and sufficiency of tags will be tackled by original infor-
mation providers and the crowd again. Other users receive subsidized points for providing
tags that meet the two criteria.
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4.4.4 Fraud Reporting
Fraud prevention is critically important to the success of an information market platform.
Market rules and platform technology are imperfect. There are often "smart" users who
challenge the platform designer and try to gain unfair advantages. We have covered in detail
market fraud and fraud prevention in the previous section. It's worthwhile to reemphasize
fraud in this chapter / section because market fraud prevention is also crowd-sourced to all
users and depends on them to report fraud and clean up fraudulent behaviors out of the
platform.
Fraud reporting and voting on judging are "good behaviors" that we need to promote and
the "central bank" can reward. Users help clean up fraudulent behaviors not only for
contributing to establish a honest social culture, but also for receiving points reward if the
fraud report is accurate.
The fraud-prevention mechanism needs to avoid fixed-pricing scheme. For instance - receiv-
ing 3 points for reporting a fraud, or receiving 2 points for making a judgment on a fraud
case will lead to irresponsible behaviors from users. They might randomly report others
and make a judgment just to receive the reward points. They should only receive rewards
if they successfully convict a fraud case.
4.5 Derivative Market for Information Products
4.5.1 Definition & Overview
The term "Derivative Market" is used in contrast with the "Primary Market" of information
products.
Primary Market is where users directly purchase and sell primitive knowledge or infor-
mation products. For example, a user posts a document for a price, and other users
purchase the document after payment. Or, a user asks a question with certain points
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as bounty, and allocate points among answerers who provide useful knowledge. These
are all direct knowledge / point transactions that happen in the "Primary Market",
which represent the simplest forms of market interactions;
Derivative Market is where users purchase and sell securities, whose value is determined
or "derived" from the value of the underlying information products. The structure
and creation of such securities is much more complex and adds challenges to user
understanding of the mechanism and user interface design.
We call the process of structuring and creating securities derived from information products
"information securitization". The exchange for trading such securities is named "Derivative
Market" for information.
We first build the basis for information securitization by visiting finance 101. A firm's
valuation can significantly exceed the value of its assets because of its profit-generating
capability in future. The valuation is calculated based upon the present value of future
income flows. This fact builds the basis for the stock / equity market. An individual
prefers to own a stock because a share of stock implies fractional ownership of the company.
In addition, the value of a share of stock theoretically depends on the present value of all
futuristic possible dividend income, which in turn depends on the profiting capability of the
firm. A buy / sell decision is made based upon whether one believes the market price of a
stock is lower / higher than its true value.
The root cause of information securitization is based upon the fact that information has
spill-over effects - information re-usage creates consistent and long-term value to the com-
munity. From our analysis and introduced mechanism design in previous sections, valuable
information or knowledge gets reused after its initial creation, which is rewarded by the
"central bank" in a continuous fashion. A valuable piece of knowledge thus gets periodic
point inflows that are commensurate with its value. This "profit generating" capability of
information builds the basis and ground for information securitization.
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Figure 4-5: Illustration of the information securitization process and derivative markets
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The derivative market
4.5.2 Examples & Use Cases
In the Q&A market and the document market, answers and documents contributed by
knowledge providers have long-term reuse value. Based upon our prior discussion on re-
warding reuse, these knowledge items can potentially receive periodic income flows based
on their reuse during a certain period. The owner of an answer or a document can choose
to divide the ownership into N shares, and sell some or all of the shares to the other users
with certain prices for an immediate point return. After this "going public" moment, all
further reuse rewards coming from the central bank will be divided based on the number of
shares, and distributed among share owners.
4.5.3 Benefits & Caveats
Securitizing information products and designing a secondary market for exchanging se-
curities brings unique strengths to the platform and solves some challenging problems in
platform economics.
9 Information securitization and derivative market trading adds great gamification and
fun components to the platform. Users solve knowledge problems by participating in
a fun game.
e Information securitization and exchange helps with knowledge validation, updating
and quality assurance. Owners of an information item has incentives to maximize
its valuation on the market by improving tagging, knowledge quality, and keeping it
up-to-date, because the value of an information item is theoretically determined by
its re-usage.
e If the derivative market for securitized information products is effective and efficient,
the market price information serves as a stronger and more accurate signal for the
value of an information item, compared with other signals such as tipped amounts,
votes, or visits. This is useful for knowledge valuation and sorting.
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* Information securitization and exchange helps with a smooth transfer of ownership of
knowledge and innovation, and better tracks credit-sharing.
These benefits come with caveats and challenges on mechanism design:
" Information securitization and a secondary market for exchanging the securities in-
volve complex financial theories and practice that add notable complexity and con-
fusion to the platform and to end users. Confining complexities at the back-end and
designing intuitive user interfaces and experiences are critical to its practical usage.
" Market repugnance needs to be managed well. The platform should not look overly
mercenary.
" Having such a security market provides an opportunity for market manipulation.
Users with excessive currency reserve can influence the price and transaction volumes
of such securities, which can mislead other users when doing assessment. Rules and
regulations need to be in place to monitor and regulate the marketplace.
" The robustness and correctness of the derivative market critically depend on the the
robustness and correctness of the primary market, especially the mechanism design
on rewarding the re-usage of information. Deploying the derivative market adds a
more stringent requirement on the error-tolerance of the primary market mechanism
design.
4.6 Summary
This chapter covers mechanism design issues when we design monetary policies and fiscal
policies. We also explain information securitization and derivative markets in more details.
A knowledge economy is a complex system with convoluted network and market interac-
tions among participants and the "Planner". Managing a knowledge economy striving for
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Figure 4-6: Parameter estimation of the knowledge economy
prosperity relies on outputs from this complex system as key indicators and different eco-
nomic policy tools as inputs. The "objective functions" to optimize include 1) knowledge
creation and sharing (knowledge GDP), 2) sufficient fairness, and 3) users' activities, shown
in Fig.4-6. As shown in the above mechanism design, it is often difficult to model all pa-
rameters and system dynamics in a closed form. The relationship between system outputs
and inputs is not deterministic nor transparent. Estimating the optimal parameters for
policy tools takes tuning and experiences. This is also why established economic theories
and proven practice are crucial in running a successful knowledge economy.
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Chapter 5
System Deployment & User
Studies
5.1 Software Development
Barter is a web-based software platform that realizes the information market design in our
research. The software platform is built both as a prototype demonstrating the concepts
of knowledge currency, markets, and economic policies, but also used as an experimental
testbed to conduct user studies and gain insights from system deployment. At the time of
writing this dissertation, the software is still being actively developed and strengthened.
Fig.5-1 shows the front page of Barter when users visit. Fig.5-2 shows the landing homepage
after a user logs in. From the landing page, we can have a visual understanding of what
functionalities Barter is offering. Users can navigate through different types of knowledge
markets such as Q&A, Document, Idea, Product Auction markets. They can also share
news items based on the attention module, and report bug fixes or request features on the
Design market (named "Fix"). At the center of the homepage, is a news feed where newly
created knowledge objects or requests are listed and shared. Users can quickly locate the
knowledge objects they need by advanced sorting, filtering and searching. Users can also
111
Figure 5-1: The entry page of Barter, captured
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Figure 5-2: The landing page of Barter after users' login
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browse the knowledge base using the tag cloud, starting from which they can identify top
experts on each tag and visualize how much value of knowledge has been created on each
tag. Users can readily check their account balance, and access transaction history.
5.2 Deployment & Experimental Setup
Barter has been deployed in a few different environments, primarily in university settings
as either a teaching tool, or a social knowledge sharing platform. Our user studies and
reporting results are mainly based upon the following deployments:
" About 550 students enrolling in a distance-learning program at a French university
used an instance of Barter for discussions and knowledge exchanges;
" About 400 students / researchers from three U.S. universities used an instance of
Barter as both class tools and daily knowledge sharing tools;
" Entrepreneurship courses used an instance of Barter - primarily the idea market - for
students to exchange venture ideas.
In these deployments, users started with certain number of points assigned to their bank
accounts. We do not ask users to engage in any particular activity attentively. Barter
simply serves as a day-to-day tool for students to exchange knowledge, share documents,
contribute ideas, post news, etc., following the underlying market rules.
Incentive design, especially the translation of virtual points to meaningful rewards, i.e.
backing up the virtual currency, is important to getting users motivated and engaged.
The product auction market provides a mechanism for users to exchange earned points for
material rewards they care about. We, as researchers and "managers" of the knowledge
economy, employed monetary and fiscal policies. To back up currency value and control
currency supply, we posted items in the auction market for sale. Meanwhile, we can use
the auction market to measure the dollar value of information created on the platform. For
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example, We posted iTunes gift cards, small consumer products, and lunch opportunities
with faculty members on the auction market. All user activities, transactions and market
statistics have been captured and stored by the system. Through the wide deployment of
Barter, we are able to collect a rich dataset on market operations and user behaviors. We
mainly aim at obtaining insights for the following research questions.
" Will purely virtual currency suffices in building incentives without being backed up
externally with material value?
" Are users sensitive to pricing signals of knowledge objects and requests for knowledge
objects?
" Will fixed-pricing lead to oversupply of garbage information?
" Are social interactions effective in driving users to share and contribute?
" What types of market fraud tend to be created in knowledge markets? Are crow-
sourcing based fraud prevention mechanism effective in cleaning up the fraud and
preventing future fraud from happening?
" Can we measure the value of information created, and how does it compare against $
value spent on the auction market?
In the following sections, we will answer these questions through quantitative and qualitative
analysis of user data collected from software deployment.
5.3 Analysis & Findings
5.3.1 Users are responsive to material incentives
A frequently asked question on the usage of knowledge currency is whether purely virtual
currency suffices in building incentives without external backup. We understand that virtual
currency can be used to purchase knowledge, build reputation and expertise, and introduce
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gamification aspects, but will users be satisfied with these virtual utilities of currency? As
introduced in the chapter of system architecture, Barter uses the product auction market
to back up currency with material incentives. We aim at understanding the effectiveness
and necessity of doing so.
Fig.5-3 shows several dashboards for monitoring the global economy for the time period
04/2010 - 04/2011 on the U.S. site - the number of questions and answers each day, the
"price index" of the Q&A market, and the transaction volume as time series. The "chief
economist" of Barter can use it to monitor several key economic indicators of the economy
and decide if it is overheated or needs stimulation. For example, he can implement monetary
or fiscal policies following our design in the previous chapter.
We tested the effectiveness of backing up currency using material rewards through interven-
tions. We started the platform and deployed it for users with virtual currency only without
posting any items on the auction market. We first intervened by adding a significant amount
of products and awards, including an iPad, for auction during a certain period. We then
suspended the supply of awards on the auction market for another period and examined
how user activities responded to these external interventions.
It is evident from these curves that users do respond to material incentives. In mid-June
2010, we posted an iPad on the auction market among many other awards such as mobile
devices, gift cards, free lunch opportunities with faculty members. These extrinsic awards
greatly stimulated market activities (and market fraud too!). The number of transactions
per day increased from 6.9 in April to 22.0 in May, when the iPad auction expired. It
dropped back to 9.2 in June as fewer items were left in the auction market. The transaction
volume increased from 337.0 points in April to 994.9 in May, and fell back to 160.3 in June.
In March 2011, we released the news sharing module to users and posted several valuable
rewards on the auction market, which also stimulated the economy significantly. Between
these two promotion periods when plenty of awards were on sale in the auction market, user
activities remain low.
From the analysis above, we learn that although virtual currency does provide utilities
to users such as purchasing other users' knowledge and building reputation / expertise,
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Figure 5-3: Dashboards for monitoring the knowledge economy, which show time series of:
1) the number of questions and answers (top), 2)Price indexes (middle), and 3) frequency
and volume of market transactions on each day from 04/20/2010 to 04/16/2011. Jumps in
activity and price levels occurred in June 2010 when we offered an iPad prize, and March-
April 2011 when we launched the News market with material prizes on the auction market.
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Figure 5-4: Number of questions asked categorized by the number of points offered - a) all
questions; b) anonymous questions; c) non-anonymous questions.
users more appreciate currency backed by material value. Backing up virtual currency
both "internally" and "externally" provides more incentives for users to earn currency, thus
stimulates user activities, especially during the adoption phase of the knowledge platform.
5.3.2 Market forces are significant
A frequently asked question in the context of an information market is whether market
forces, especially price signals, are effective. The Q&A market was first implemented and
used in the deployment. Thus, we analyze data collected from the Q&A market of the U.S.
site to see whether offered points affect the quantity and quality of provided answers.
Fig.5-4 shows the number of questions asked on the U.S. site for each level of offered points
- for all, anonymous, non-anonymous questions. Most questions were asked with around 25
points offered, while only a limited number of questions rewarded 100+ points.
Fig.5-5 shows the average number of answers a question received for different levels of
offered points. When the number of offered points is below 100, the average number of
submitted answers received generally increase as the number of offered points arises. As
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Figure 5-5: Average number of answers obtained, categorized by the number of points of-
fered for questions - a) all questions; b) anonymous questions; c) non-anonymous questions.
the offered points exceed 100, the difficulty of the question increases more significantly,
thus the number of submitted answers decreases sharply with offered points. There appears
strong linearity for anonymous questions. As in [21], we use the average length of answers
as a proxy for answer quality. It is evident from Fig.5-6 that the average length of answers
keeps increasing as the offered points arises for a question, and when the offered points
exceed 100, the increased difficulty thwarts good quality answers.
Both curves exhibit a reverse-U shape, and the local maximum is reached when the number
of offered points are in the 90-110 range, for both the quantity and quality of answers. More
interestingly, this is also where the curve in Fig.5-4 reaches a local peak value, which implies
that users asked a significant number of questions within this price range.
Therefore, the price effects are prominent. Price Theory properly balances the marginal
rates of substitution between using an expert's time to help others versus having him per-
form his own work, thus addresses the efficient allocation problem.
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Figure 5-6: Average length of answers obtained, categorized by the number of points offered
for questions - a) all questions; b) anonymous questions; c) non-anonymous questions.
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Figure 5-7: Transactions categorized by 1) markets, 2) transaction types
5.3.3 Fixed-Pricing Results in Oversupply of Low-quality Information
As introduced earlier, we prefer decentralized knowledge markets to a top-down incentive
structure where fixed-reward, i.e. fixed-pricing, is used. Fixed pricing leads to oversupply
of low-quality information that is less valuable than the given price and under-supply of
high-quality information that is more valuable than the given price. The same caveat also
applies to fiscal policies for rewarding good behaviors such as voting or tagging.
In order to examine the effects of fixed-pricing, on the French site, we employed the following
fixed-pricing rules to encourage voting and commenting: 1) Users receive 2 points when they
vote, either up or down, limited by 5 times a day; 2) Users receive 2 points when they leave
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a comment, limited by 5 times a day. We observed how users acted to leverage these
fixed-pricing rules.
As expected, certain users left trivial garbage comments just to collect the 2 points. Many
of such comments contained only 1 or 2 letters. These garbage comments were useless in
terms of their knowledge value. Certain users randomly clicked on voting buttons just to
collect the 2 points. Such votes did not reflect these voters' true assessment of the quality
of answers. Thus, such votes did not provide any value for knowledge sorting and valuation.
Conversely, they created huge noise for other users to understand the quality of existing
answers. The reuse tracking module does not work properly with such garbage votes.
Fig.5-7 shows transaction volumes categorized by markets and transaction types after the
French site was deployed for 3 months with these fixed-pricing rules. It displays the knowl-
edge G.D.P. pie with constituent slices. On the French site, the Q&A market was the
primary knowledge exchange tool for students, while the other markets were lightly used.
We expected that the "Q&A slice" should be the largest slice contributing a dominant share
to the knowledge G.D.P. However, because of the ill-placed fixed-pricing rules, the slice for
"Q&A Thumbing" is twice as large as the "Q&A" itself. The slices for "Q&A Comment
Answers" is also quite sizable. This clearly indicates a serious problem.
Therefore, fixed-pricing introduces oversupply of low-quality information and unwanted
behaviors. We must tackle the adverse effects of fix-pricing when we design fiscal policies
or measure information value.
5.3.4 Cultural Differences
Different cultures can be cultivated in different communities. For example, on both the
French site and the U.S. site, new users started with 2000 points. However, users on the
French site offered much lower bounty for their questions - 27.8 on average. In contrast,
users on the U.S. site offered 63.96 on average. Users on the French site make their earnings
mostly through the "Planner"'s subsidies, instead of making earnings from other users
by sharing knowledge and information. As clearly shown in Fig.5-7, the size of the pie
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"Q&A thumbing" is notably larger than "Q&A" itself. On the French site, users used the
auction market much more actively, more than 96% of auction items were posted by users
themselves, while on the U.S. site, over 90% of auction products were posted by researchers
ourselves to back up the currency value.
5.3.5 Exchange Rate & Evaluating Information
The knowledge economy framework provides an effective way of calculating the exchange
rate between virtual currency and real U.S. $, and measuring the value of all knowledge
created on the platform. In the context of firms making investment on IT platforms, this
fact implies that a knowledge economy platform is not merely a "cost / expense" with
intangible benefits. Instead, we are able to accurately estimate the $ value created by
the knowledge economy, and justify the return on investment. We use data from the U.S.
deployment to demonstrate how this is accomplished.
Using virtual currency to exchange knowledge following market rules, and spending virtual
currency on material rewards through the auction market provide a mechanism to calculate
the exchange rate and measure the value of information created on the platform. Using
the U.S. site as an example, we select 11 product items of which we can easily obtain the
dollar values, such as a $10 itunes card or the iPad. Virtual rewards such as "Knight of
Barter", or items with undefined $ value such as "A pingpong lesson" are excluded from the
calculation. After performing linear regression, we can obtain the approximate exchange
rate between U.S. dollar and Barter's virtual currency is $1 = 6.64(Barter Points).
After obtaining the exchange rate, we next estimate the G.D.P. of knowledge economy
denominated in Barter's currency. As discussed in the previous chapter, G.D.P. is calculated
by counting transactions of various types. Here we only count transactions between two
users in the Q&A market. This is a subset of all knowledge transactions. During the 1-year
period from 04.2010 to 04.2011, the total transaction volume happening in the Q&A market
is 7476 Barter Points - the sum of points offered and transacted for solved questions. Using
the exchange rate obtained above, the value of information created in the Q&A market is
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$1126 denominated in U.S. dollars. This exceeds the value of what we spent to purchase
the posted products and stimulate the knowledge economy, which was about $750. This
doesn't include value created in other knowledge markets such as the document and idea
markets, and doesn't count other value created such as users' voting and tipping for helping
sort and index information.
The analysis above also addresses questions on whether it is cost-effective to back up the
knowledge currency with material rewards, which incur extra spending in addition to the
investment on building and deploying the knowledge economy platform itself. The afore-
mentioned example shows that investment on the product auction market has multiplication
effects, which stimulates greater value created on knowledge.
5.3.6 Market Fraud & Fraud Prevention
Knowledge markets, or more generally any platforms with currency and certain gamification
aspects, are facing the challenge of fraudulent behaviors. Users tend to exploit system
loopholes or game ill-designed rules to gain unfair advantage and earn points that are not
a result of true contribution. In our deployment, we aimed at observing user behaviors to
answer the following questions:
e What fraudulent or gaming behaviors users exhibited?
e Does peer-pressure or social connections help reduce fraudulent behaviors?
e Is a crowd-based fraud prevention mechanism effective in cleaning up market fraud
and maintaining the integrity of knowledge markets?
We use data from the U.S. site to answer these questions. Students and teaching staff
of a course used Barter as a knowledge exchange tool. It is worth emphasizing that the
definition and scope of fraud is relative. Users might exploit ill-designed market rules to
gain unfair advantage. However, if such behaviors were not explicitly forbidden and made
known to users upfront, such exploitation should not be considered fraudulent. Therefore,
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before students started to use Barter, we made it clear that all users should earn points for
true knowledge sharing and contribution.
It turned out that users were quite active and creative in exploiting market loopholes,
especially after they learned that they can spend the currency for material awards in the
auction market. Some examples include
" Users left garbage comments or voted randomly to collect system subsidies, as intro-
duced above when we discussed about fixed-pricing;
" Users uploaded copyright-infringing documents for sale in the document market;
" Users laundered money with each other by tipping each other with unreasonably high
amounts, or asking / answering each other trivial questions. The primary goal for
such transfers was to convert currency types - after the transfer, currency has longer
expiration period, and becomes spendable in the auction market;
" In order to encourage users to allocate points on time after the questions they asked
got enough answers, we ran a campaign promotion that askers could receive 1/4 of
the bounty back if they allocated points on time. During the promotion period, users
colluded with each other actively by asking / answering trivial questions back and
forth to earn the "Planner"s subsidy every time.
Students and their teaching staff have social connections among themselves in their real life.
Their true identities, such as names and affiliations were also displayed and made known to
others by default. Therefore, it does not appear that peer social pressure helps preventing
gaming behaviors. Such gaming and fraudulent activities were unfair to other users who
earned the points in honest and diligent ways, and harmful to the entire platform.
After one month, we introduced the intervention by opening the "Resolution" space - which
was the crowd-based fraud prevention module. Users could flag contents or behaviors as
fraudulent, and if enough users concurred, such suspicious items would be moved to the
"Resolution" space for further voting. Eventually a verdict would be made on whether the
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item was actually fraudulent or not. Users who participate in reporting and voting get
rewarded if they stand on the right side. 23 fraud cases were immediately reported after
the launch of the fraud prevention mechanism. After that, affected users got warned and
penalized, so they started to pay attention to their behaviors. 0 fraud cases got detected
or reported afterwards. Therefore, a decentralized fraud-prevention mechanism is proven
effective, in our case, to clean up the platform and maintain the integrity of the markets.
As explained in the introductory chapters, the goal of designing a knowledge economy is to
establish a solution framework for all knowledge platforms facing similar knowledge-related
challenges. In this dissertation, we do focus more on an organizational setting, where such
a knowledge economy is deployed within an organizational boundary. The organizational
boundary does have practical implications when it comes to market fraud and currency
backup - which are more challenging in a public setting. The hierarchical structure of an
organization and close social connection among colleagues reduce the risk and likelihood
of market fraud. Organizations can back up the currency more freely using creative ways
without concerning too much on currency forgery and security. The challenges on currency
security and fraud prevention are greatly scaled up in a public knowledge economy with no
established structure among users.
5.3.7 Impacts of Social Connections
Users could opt to log onto Barter using a social authentication API. Among those users
who used this social authentication API to log in, we could establish a symmetric 0/1 matrix
of their social connections. We wish to understand the impacts of users' social links on their
activities within the knowledge economy.
Among 400+ users on the U.S. site, 65 users logged onto Barter using the social authen-
tication API. At a particular time point, each of them had 20 friends on average. There
were over 5000 knowledge transactions among all users. 487 transactions had at least one
party who logged in using the social authentication API, and 186 transactions happened
between two users who logged in using the social authentication API. Only 12 knowledge
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transactions took place between two friends, which was less than 7% of the 186 transactions.
From the statistics above, we could see that when users decided on knowledge purchases or
rewards, impacts of their social connections were not significant.
On the other hand, all fraud cases which were results of collusion involving two users such
as money laundering occurred between friends.
5.3.8 Summary
This chapter covers our software development and deployment, and discusses on lessons
learned from several deployments. The software developed and deployed was not a com-
plete implementation of the system architecture proposed in previous chapters. Instead,
the purpose of developing the software was to illustrate key concepts presented in this
dissertation, and obtain several targeted market-related insights through user study and
quantitative and qualitative analysis of collected data.
The software provides an experimental testbed for future research deployments and user
studies.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this dissertation research, we present the design of an information market framework
which is able to provide a long-term sustainable incentive structure to organization members
to collaboratively share knowledge and create innovation. We design a knowledge economy
with three core components: knowledge currency, decentralized knowledge markets, and
economic policies to stimulate or moderate user activities.
The management of an organization backs up the value of knowledge currency externally
using material rewards through an auction market. Knowledge currency is used to track
reputation and expertise on different areas to strengthen social incentives, and cashed out
to purchase material goods and services to provide economic incentives. Decentralized
knowledge markets replace top-down incentive structure where fixed rewards are usually
misused. These peer-to-peer markets are efficient and effective in allocating resource, val-
uating knowledge objects, and enriching the knowledge base with missed knowledge. The
organization management designs and employs economic policies as advanced managerial
tools for the platform. Monetary policies manage currency supply and set target currency
growth rates. The "Planner" fills the government's role, and uses fiscal policies to cre-
ate public services and optimize social welfare. The "Planner" allocates budgets for fiscal
spending, which includes rewarding knowledge reuse, encouraging behavioral modification,
and running campaign promotions.
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There are a few critical modules and architectural design choices made that guard and
enhance market safety, efficiency, and fairness. These modules include 1) attention module
to recognize the time value of experts and individuals and reduce noise and clutter of
information; 2) fraud detection and prevention module that protects markets from gaming
and fraudulent behaviors; 3) reuse tracking module that captures and rewards the spillover
of knowledge in longterm; 4) optimization of currency expiration to stimulate user activities
and maximize knowledge creation; 5) knowledge securitization and derivative markets.
A knowledge economy is a complex system with convoluted network and market inter-
actions among participants and the "Planner". Managing a knowledge economy striving
for prosperity relies on outputs from this complex system as key indicators and different
economic policies tools as inputs. The "objective functions" to optimize include 1) knowl-
edge creation and sharing (knowledge GDP), 2) sufficient fairness. When deploying such
a knowledge economy inside an organization, impacts on organizational culture and value
must also be considered - incentives should be constructed and placed in a pro-social way.
A major contribution of this dissertation research is a thorough treatment of subjects that
involve using virtual currency in knowledge-related platforms, and a complete design of
a knowledge economy. By applying innovative market mechanism design, we are able to
address organizational challenges using a market mechanism efficiently.
We have also introduced software development, deployment, and lessons learned from these
user experiments. Our software deployment demonstrates that market forces are effective in
incentivizing users to contribute information and engage in a new platform. Fixed-rewards
scheme for behavioral modification is a deficient design, which usually leads to oversupply
of valueless activities. Users are "creative" and active in exploring market loopholes and
gaming the system. A crowd-sourcing based fraud prevention mechanism is effective in
cleaning up the system, and cordon the markets from future fraud. Social and economic
incentives co-exist in such a marketplace. We could calculate the exchange rate between
virtual currency and real U.S. dollars, and measure the value of created knowledge - the
knowledge GDP. From the management's perspective, the value of stimulated knowledge
creation is much larger than the value of investment on the production auction market.
128
The software we have developed provides an ideal experimental testbed for future research
deployments and user studies.
Future research questions that can be explored both theoretically and experimentally in-
clude:
" Can securitization and a secondary market encourage user participation, increase
market liquidity, and enhance the quality and validity of provided information?
" How to rigorously quantify and compare the impacts of social incentives and economic
incentives?
" What is the optimal currency expiration and conversion rules for currency acceleration
and economy stimulus?
" What are the best rewards-allocation algorithms for rewarding good behaviors such
as voting and tagging when employing fiscal policies?
We believe this is an interesting and promising research area that is worth more exploration.
There are a rich set of problems to be more thoroughly investigated and addressed. This
dissertation lays down some groundwork, and provides a framework for further research and
explorations. The learnings from the research will offer great insights into organizational
design as well.
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